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I. INTRODUCTION 
For most of his twenty-five years on the United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Kennedy has been predominantly known as a moderate civil libertarian. 
He has struck a course between those Justices perceived as conservative—such 
as Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito—and those Justices perceived as liberal—such as Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.1 This 
Article seeks to explore Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence with respect to his 
political position’s influence on his decision making, and specifically Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence relating to the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
Part II of this Article discusses Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian 
position. In contrast, Part III notes that in a few cases Justice Kennedy has joined 
his more conservative judicial colleagues and that he may join them in future 
cases. Part IV then notes that with respect to the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, Justice 
Kennedy has likewise adopted more conservative judicial positions. 
For most of his tenure on the Court, Justice Kennedy served with other 
moderate-to-liberal Republican-appointed Justices, including moderate Justices 
O’Connor and Souter, and more liberal Justices Blackmun and Stevens. As this 
Article goes to press, the Court is split between four conservative, Republican-
appointed Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito—and four liberal, Democratic-appointed Justices—Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. As he is a Republican and appointed by 
Republican Presidents,2 and without the pull of moderate Republicans on the 
Court, it is possible that Justice Kennedy may tend to lean more toward the 
conservative, Republican side in future cases. If so, his legacy on the Court may 
not be as a moderate civil libertarian, which it is today, but reflect more the 
conservative strain in his jurisprudence. 
II. KENNEDY AS A MODERATE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN 
Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian approach is most prominent in 
four different areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence: (1) Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clause analysis, (2) First Amendment, Freedom of Speech Doctrine, 
 
1. See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 1–2 (2009), and sources cited therein. 
2.  Justice Kennedy, a native of Sacramento, California, received his B.A. from Stanford University in 
1958, spending his senior year at the London School of Economics. He received his LL.B. from Harvard Law 
School in 1961. He was in private practice in San Francisco, California from 1961–63, and in Sacramento, 
California from 1963–75. In 1975, he was confirmed to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, after being nominated by President Ford. President Reagan nominated him to be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court in 1987, and he was confirmed and took his seat on February 18, 1988. 
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(3) criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, and (4) structural issues of 
separation of powers and federalism. 
A.  Due Process and Equal Protection Clause Analysis 
1.  Sexual Orientation Cases 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Romer v. Evans that Amendment 2 of 
the Colorado Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause because it lacked 
a rational relation to a legitimate end.3 Amendment 2 barred any law entitling 
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals to “claim any minority status, quota preferences, 
protected status or claim of discrimination.”4 Justice Kennedy stated that the 
breadth of the law made gays and lesbians unequal to everyone else, and thus the 
only conceivable justification for the law was illegitimate animus toward persons 
based upon sexual orientation.5 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas, dissented.6 
Reflecting a moderate civil-libertarian position, however, Justice Kennedy 
did not accept the argument that Amendment 2 burdened a fundamental right or 
targeted a suspect class thereby warranting application of heightened scrutiny.7 
This is true despite conflicting arguments stressing a history of discriminatory 
legislation based upon false stereotypes, and despite increasing evidence that 
sexual orientation is a substantially immutable characteristic determined 
predominantly by genetics and hormonal influences and not the product of 
individual choice.8 Under some state constitutions, state supreme courts have 
ruled that sexual orientation discrimination is a suspect class, triggering strict 
scrutiny.9 One could also argue that discrimination based upon sexual orientation 
draws distinctions based upon sex, and thus is a form of gender discrimination 
that should trigger intermediate review.10 Despite such arguments, Supreme Court 
 
3. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
4. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional by Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). 
5. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635. 
6. Id. at 636–50 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (Amendment 2 reflects 
the traditional “view that homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful.”). 
7. Id. at 631. 
8. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 937–46 (1989); Jeffrey A. Kershaw, Toward an Establishment 
Theory of Gay Personhood, 58 VAND. L. REV. 555, 580–93 (2005). 
9. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401–02 (Cal. 2008); Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences 
Univ., 971 P.2d 425, 445–48 (Or. App. 1998); Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499–502 (Ky. 1992). This 
view has also appeared in some dissenting state supreme court opinions. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 23, 27–30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., joined by Ciparick, J., dissenting); Andersen v. King County, 138 
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., joined by Bridge, Owens & Chambers, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1038 
(Bridge, J., concurring in dissent). 
10. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407, 412, 422–23, 441 & n.31 (Conn. 
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majorities, led by Justice Kennedy, and thus lower federal courts, have 
consistently treated constitutional questions involving discrimination based upon 
sexual orientation as involving only rational review.11 
Nonetheless, under rational review, gays and lesbians have had some 
significant legal victories. In 1986, the Court held, by a 5–4 decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, that a law criminalizing sodomy was constitutional.12 In 2003, the 
Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.13 Joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Kennedy wrote that a reasoned elaboration 
of the Court’s precedents 
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex. . . . When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the 
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject 
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private 
spheres. . . . [This] demeans the lives of homosexual persons.14 
As in Romer, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, dissented.15 
This disagreement between Justices Kennedy and Scalia in Lawrence may 
have application beyond the facts of the particular case. On behalf of the Court, 
and echoing a dissent by Justice Stevens in Bowers, Justice Kennedy said that 
“the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”16 Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent that this 
 
2008); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63–67 (Haw. 1993); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896–97 (Iowa 
2009). 
11. See generally Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463–66 (7th Cir. 
1989); Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984). In 1988, a Ninth Circuit 
panel did apply strict scrutiny to the Army’s policy of discrimination based upon sexual orientation in Watkins 
v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345–49 (9th Cir. 1988), but on en banc review, the case was resolved on 
grounds of equitable estoppel preventing the government from failing to reenlist the individual in the particular 
case. 875 F.2d 699, 705–07, 771 (9th Cir. 1989). Since Watkins, the Ninth Circuit has applied rational review in 
these kinds of cases. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 571–74 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
12. 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986). 
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Kennedy, J., opinion for the Court). 
14. Id. at 572, 575. 
15. Id. at 598, 602 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]n ‘emerging 
awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition[s]’. . . . Many Americans 
[still] do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as 
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view 
this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral . . . .”). 
16. Id. at 577–78 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 & n.9) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967))). 
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reasoning “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation” and that this 
includes laws against “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.”17 Justice Kennedy 
indicated that the case was more limited, saying: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship[s] that homosexual persons 
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual 
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to [their] 
lifestyle. 18 
Justice Kennedy’s passage is consistent with the principle concerning giving 
other persons equal concern and respect and not engaging in arbitrary coercion. 
This principle makes it possible to draw distinctions among Justice Scalia’s 
“parade of horribles.” Because they are related to protecting against coercion and 
exploitation, laws against bigamy, adult incest, prostitution, bestiality, and 
obscenity likely can still be criminalized after Lawrence.19 Masturbation cannot, 
and fornication and adultery likely cannot.20 Same-sex marriage will likely 
eventually become a constitutional right, but only after a period of increasing 
legislative acceptance in a number of states.21 
  
 
17. Id. at 590, 599 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). 
18. Id. at 578. 
19. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20. See generally Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369–71 (Va. 2005) (fornication statute 
unconstitutional after Lawrence, and thus fornication no longer a bar to suit for herpes transmission); Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1247–58 (2004) (stating that regulation on grounds of traditional “morals” was accepted between 
1873–1937, but since 1954, the Court has almost never upheld a statute based on “moral” grounds alone, with 
the exception of Bowers v. Hardwick, which has now been overruled); Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The 
Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 
174–78 (1997); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837 (2006) (noting that twenty-three states continue to recognize adultery as a crime, 
although statutes rarely enforced). 
21. The Supreme Court will hear the issue sooner, rather than later. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2012 No.12-144, 2012 WL 3134429 (U.S. Dec. 
7, 2012). The Ninth Circuit held California Proposition 8’s ban recognizing same-sex marriages in California 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Id. On this issue, see Larry Levine, 
Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and the Struggle for Marriage Equality, 44 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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2.  Abortion Rights Cases 
In 1989, the Court was faced with an opportunity to overrule or dramatically 
limit Roe v. Wade. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a three-Justice 
plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and 
Kennedy, criticized Roe and stated that Roe’s “trimester framework has left this 
Court to serve as the country’s ‘ex officio medical board with powers to approve 
or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the 
United States.’”22 Justice Scalia indicated his willingness to overturn Roe in its 
entirety.23 In contrast, Justice O’Connor decided that it was not necessary in 
Webster to consider Roe’s broader implications, even though she had previously 
indicated discomfort with the Roe framework.24 In Webster, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that even under the Roe framework, the substantive regulations at 
issue in this case—a ban on use of public employees, facilities, or funds for 
performance or assistance with nontherapeutic abortions (that is, those abortions 
not needed for the mother’s health),25 and physicians being required to perform 
reasonable viability tests on a fetus believed to be of twenty or more weeks 
gestational age—were constitutional.26 Laws banning use of public funds or 
public facilities for abortions have routinely been viewed as constitutional under 
Roe.27 
Three years later, in 1992, Roe’s legacy was squarely faced in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.28 In a 5–4 decision, the Court 
decided not to overrule Roe v. Wade in its entirety.29 Justice Scalia, with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, dissented on that matter.30 
Justice Scalia said that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental liberty to 
abort an unborn child because of two facts: “(1) the Constitution says absolutely 
nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have 
permitted it to be legally proscribed.”31 In contrast, Justice Blackmun would have 
had the Court not disturb Roe’s holding and trimester framework in any respect.32 
 
22. 492 U.S. 490, 518–19 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ., plurality). 
23. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
24. Id. at 525 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
25. C.f. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, ABORTION (9th ed. 2009) (defining a therapeutic abortion as one 
that is “carried out to preserve the life or health of the mother”). 
26. Id. at 523–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) (citing Thornburgh v. 
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)). 
27. Id. at 523 (citing, inter alia, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980)). 
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
29. Id. at 845–46. 
30. Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 980. 
32. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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Justice Stevens, also supporting Roe, said that it protected a woman’s freedom 
“to decide matters of the highest privacy and most personal nature.”33 
The outcome of the case thus depended on the views of Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter. They adopted a moderate civil-libertarian position. The 
joint opinion said: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, 
and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life.34 
The authors’ analysis stated the importance of individual liberty “combined 
with the force of stare decisis” outweighed their reservations about “reaffirming 
the central holding of Roe.”35 Here, stare decisis was not outweighed by any 
concern about whether Roe was wrongly decided because the case has not proved 
unworkable, people have relied on the decision, no evolution of legal principle 
had weakened its doctrinal footings, its factual underpinnings remain intact, it 
has been expressly reaffirmed several times, and overruling it might be perceived 
as a surrender to political pressure.36 
Having refused to overrule the central principle that a woman has a right to 
terminate her pregnancy before viability, the joint opinion substituted an “undue 
burden” test for determining when the fundamental right had been violated—the 
question being whether a state regulation has “the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus.”37 The opinion then applied that test to the state law in question, striking 
down a requirement of spousal notification, but upholding, under rational review, 
requirements of written informed consent, providing certain information to the 
patient, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, record keeping, and a parental 
consent provision for women under eighteen, with the opportunity to pursue a 
judicial bypass.38 
 
33.  Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
34. Id. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter). 
35. Id. at 853. 
36. Id. at 854–61. 
37. Id. at 877. 
38. Id. at 874–901; see also Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604–09 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding state licensing provision requiring abortion clinic to have emergency transfer agreement with local 
hospital, which may require clinic to close and thus force patients to travel to an alternative clinic roughly fifty 
miles away, not an undue burden on abortion rights). 
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The opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Casey followed Roe v. 
Wade in its entirety, making every burden on abortion rights subject to strict 
scrutiny,39 thereby constitutionalizing all regulations on abortion and following 
Roe’s concern about specific harm if a pro-choice position were not adopted.40 
This approach differed from the more-moderate joint opinion in Casey, where the 
Court did not sit as a super-legislature regarding all aspects of abortion 
regulation.41 Thus, under Casey’s joint opinion, not every regulation of abortion 
was constitutionalized under a strict scrutiny approach.42 
Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian position on abortion rights is 
also reflected in his opinions on the issue of a physical health exception. In 
Stenberg v. Carhart, a 5–4 Court ruled that a Nebraska statute banning even 
postviability, partial-birth abortions (where normally states can ban abortions to 
advance the compelling interest of protecting the life of a viable fetus) was 
unconstitutional as not having a sufficient exception for the life or substantial 
health interests of the mother, as required in Roe, and modified by the “undue 
burden” analysis in Casey.43 In dissent, Justice Kennedy concluded that the 
Nebraska law’s medical emergency exception, as a less than undue burden on 
choice, was sufficient to meet the maternal health exception required by Casey.44 
Reflecting a more conservative position, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote a dissent calling for Roe and Casey to be 
overturned.45 
Following Stenberg v. Carhart, Congress passed its own version of a partial-
birth abortion ban.46 In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy followed his dissent 
in Stenberg v. Carhart and concluded that a congressional ban on partial-birth 
abortions, like the Nebraska ban, was a less than undue burden on abortion rights 
because it only limited one occasionally used means of abortion.47 Reflecting a 
 
39. See id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
40. Id. at 916–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 929–34 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 927–28 (“[C]ompelled continuation of a pregnancy . . . 
impos[es] substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm. . . . [M]otherhood has a 
dramatic impact on a woman’s educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination . . . .”); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by 
child care.”). 
41. 505 U.S. at 874–901. 
42.  Compare id. at 934–40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (applying strict scrutiny to all of the legislative regulations in Casey), with id. at 879–901 
(applying rational review to less than undue burdens on abortion choice; strict scrutiny applied only to undue 
burdens). 
43. 530 U.S. 914, 920–22, 930–31 (2000). 
44.  Id. at 956–58, 964 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 980–81 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting). 
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2000). 
47. Gonzales v. Carhart,  550 U.S. 124, 150–64 (2007) (“Partial-birth abortions” are where part of the 
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moderate civil-libertarian position, Justice Kennedy noted that Gonzales involved 
a facial challenge to the statute, and thus, for all women seeking an abortion the 
statute was not a substantial obstacle to abortion choice.48 This leaves open the 
possibility of an as-applied challenge by a woman to whom the ban on a partial-
birth abortion would be a significant obstacle given her medical condition.49 
Regarding viability testing, while in 1973 the point of viability was typically 
estimated to be around the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, by 1989, increases 
in medical technology had moved viability back to typically the twenty-fourth 
week of pregnancy, where it remains as of 2012.50 Based on fetal lung capacity, 
that point is not likely to change much in the future; although, in rare cases, 
fetuses believed to be twenty weeks or older have survived premature births.51 
Statutes requiring doctors to perform a reasonable viability test on a fetus 
believed to be in the twentieth week of pregnancy have been upheld, particularly 
because the parties might be confused as to the time of conception, and thus more 
likely viable.52 
While scholars have argued that choosing viability as a critical point in fetal 
development is somewhat arbitrary,53 the Court’s justification for viability being 
the point at which the state has a compelling interest in protecting potential life 
has remained consistent since Roe. In Roe, the Court stated: “This is so because 
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has 
both logical and biological justifications.”54 The justification is based on the 
belief that at viability, a fetus is an independent life, not necessarily part of the 
mother’s body.55 Our traditions of protecting an individual’s rights guard against 
due process and equal protection violations.56 Thus, prior to viability, there is no 
individual, and the state’s interest in fetal life is legitimate but not compelling.57 
 
fetus is pulled intact through the cervix before being dismembered, rather than the standard abortion where the 
fetal embryo is vacuumed out or the fetus is dismembered into pieces in the uterus behind the cervix before 
being removed.). 
48. Id. at 150–57. 
49. Id. at 167–68. As they had in Stenberg, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer viewed the 
congressional partial-birth abortion ban as an undue burden on abortion rights, and therefore unconstitutional. 
Id. at 169–71 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 150–57. 
51. See id. at 134–40 (discussing the implications of the law depending on the point of viability). 
52. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 523–31 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring the judgment). 
53. See Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 31 
(2013). 
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
55. Id. at 163–64. 
56. See id. at 167–68 (discussing the historical protection of individual liberty). 
57. The joint opinion in Casey underscored this reasoning. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 870–71 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter). 
We conclude the line should be drawn at viability . . . . We adhere to this principle for two reasons. 
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3.  Property Under the Takings Clause 
In Takings Clause cases, Justice Kennedy has also adopted a moderate civil-
libertarian approach. The Court applies a per se rule that any physical occupation 
of property, no matter how minor, constitutes a takings.58 The only question 
before the court is determining how much compensation must be paid.59 
In regulatory takings, however, there are two main issues of contention on 
the Court. Justice Kennedy has joined the liberals in one area and the 
conservatives in the other. The first issue is determining to what extent lost future 
opportunities are taken into account, versus impact on existing uses. The leading 
case on this issue is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.60 In 
deciding the case, Justice Brennan focused on the character of the city’s action 
and on the nature and extent of interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.61 
Focusing on the economic impact on the property as a whole, and not just on the 
particular piece being regulated, is standard in Takings Clause doctrine.62 The 
Court noted that even if the land-use law had “significantly diminished the value 
of the Terminal site,” that was just the beginning of the analysis.63 In deciding 
whether the challenger could prove that the diminution constituted a taking, 
Justice Brennan pointed to the special significance of three factors: the economic 
impact of a regulation, its interference with reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.64 
 
First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare decisis. . . . The second reason is that the concept of 
viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and 
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason 
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. . . . On 
the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the protection of potential life. The Roe 
Court recognized the State’s “important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of 
human life.” 
Id. As a general matter, about sixty percent of the roughly 1.2 million abortions in the United States each year 
take place within the first eight weeks of pregnancy; about nine in ten occur within the first twelve weeks; and 
about one percent are performed after twenty weeks. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., 
ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 2010), available at http://www. 
plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/fact_abortion_1st_tri_2010-09.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
Abortions performed after twenty-six weeks, when the fetus is likely viable, is extremely rare. Abortion After 
Twelve Weeks, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/after_12_weeks.html 
(last revised 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Almost inevitably, these are done in the context of 
substantial health risks to the mother or fetal defects not diagnosed until late in the pregnancy. Id. 
58. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982). 
59. For example, in Loretto, the Court held that the mere placement of a cable box on the roof of an 
apartment building constituted a taking. Id. at 425–28. 
60. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 130–36 (1978). 
61. Id. at 142. 
62. See generally Christopher S. Kiefer, Reconciling the Internal Inconsistency and Resolving the 
Denominator Problem in Takings Law, 10 BOSTON U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 176–79 (2000). 
63. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31. 
64. Id. 
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Justice Rehnquist took the conservative position in his dissent, saying the lost 
opportunity of using the air rights above the railroad station should be given 
greater weight in this balancing approach.65 Focusing on the profits lost by being 
denied the ability to use the air rights to build the fifty-story tower, the dissent 
concluded that the regulation went “too far” and constituted a taking of those 
rights from the property owner that was not offset by the ability to use the air 
rights on other buildings or the increase in value of Grand Central Terminal 
attributable to similar land-use restrictions on neighboring properties.66 Because 
Justice Kennedy has never adopted this more conservative, pro-property owner 
analysis, it is not the majority opinion on the Court today. Of course, where a 
complete deprivation of economically viable uses exists, a taking occurs.67 
The second issue involves whether to apply Penn Central to a case involving 
a government exaction of property rights tailored for a specific individual. Here, 
Justice Kennedy has joined with the conservatives. In Dolan v. Tigard, the Court 
held that where a city conditions the approval of a building permit on an 
individual parcel on the owner giving up some property rights, the city has the 
burden to show not only that the “‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate 
state interest’ and the permit condition,” but also that the degree of the exaction 
by the city bears a “rough proportionality” to the projected impact of the 
proposed development.68 The Court said, “No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that 
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development.”69 Four Justices dissented in Dolan. Both of the 
dissents—one by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg; 
one by Justice Souter—disagreed with the majority that the burden should have 
been shifted to the government in this case70 and would have applied the standard 
Penn Central analysis.71 
Another Takings Clause issue involves whether the taking is for a public use. 
As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent in 2005 in Kelo v. City of New London, 
clear examples of public use involve transferring “private property to public 
ownership—such as for a road, a hospital, or a military base” or transferring 
 
65. Id. at 142–43 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J., dissenting). 
66.  Id. at 138–40. 
67.  For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–16 (1992), a statute, 
as applied, barred a property owner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on beachfront property. 
The Court held that this would be a taking if it deprived the owner of all economically beneficial uses of the 
property. Id. The Court reaffirmed this per se rule that a taking will occur for complete deprivations of property 
value in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005), holding that a complete deprivation of value 
is the equivalent of a physical occupation. 
68. 512 U.S. 374, 385–91 (1994). 
69. Id. at 391. 
70. Id. at 396–407 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 411–14 (Souter, 
J., dissenting). 
71.  Id.  
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“private property to private parties, often common carriers, who make the 
property available for the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, 
or a stadium.”72 Justice O’Connor noted, however, that these two categories of 
“‘public ownership’ and ‘use-by-the-public’ are sometimes too constricting and 
impractical.”73 Under some exigent circumstances, the Court has therefore 
allowed “takings that serve a public purpose also [to] satisfy the Constitution 
even if the property is destined for subsequent private use.”74 Regardless, in Kelo, 
Justice O’Connor concluded that a case of eminent domain to aid a private 




The Kelo majority read the third category of “public purpose” takings more 
broadly.76 They noted, “[O]ur cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting 
our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments . . . . Promoting 
economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of 
government.”77 
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy adopted a moderate position between 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent and the majority. He observed: 
 This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent 
with the Public Use Clause, as long as it is “rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose.” . . . The determination that a rational-basis 
standard of review is appropriate does not, however, alter the fact that 
transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private 
entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are 
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.78 
B. The Freedom of Speech 
From his numerous free-speech opinions, three general principles emerge as 
the basis for Justice Kennedy’s belief that freedom of speech was intended to 
have, and deserves, much protection from action by all branches of state and 
federal government. These three principles, based on eighteenth century 
 
72. 545 U.S. 469, 497–98 (2005) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
73. Id. at 498. 
74.  Id. 
75. Id. at 498–502. 
76. Id. at 480, 484. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). On Justice Kennedy’s approach to the 
Takings Clause generally, see John G. Sprankling, The Property Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 61 (2013). 
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Enlightenment philosophy, are supporting political freedom; supporting 
individual autonomy; and protecting freedom to teach, learn, and innovate.79 
Justice Kennedy has been a strong protector of free-speech rights.80 He has 
been particularly influential in cases dealing with viewpoint discrimination, such 
as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.81 In 
Rosenberger, the university was paying the printing costs for a variety of 
publications by certified student organizations, but on Establishment Clause 
grounds refused to pay for a student paper that promoted “a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”82 Joined by the more conservative 
Justices, and writing for a 5–4 Court, Justice Kennedy said that this was 
viewpoint discrimination, since the university did not exclude religion as a 
subject matter, but imposed disfavored treatment on the student journalistic 
efforts that had religious editorial viewpoints.83 Justice Kennedy also wrote the 
majority opinion in Legal Services Corporation v. Velasquez.84 In Velasquez, 
Justice Kennedy was joined by the more liberal Justices in a 5–4 opinion.85 The 
Court held that where the government funds lawyers who are to speak on behalf 
of their clients, the government may not “foreclose[] advice or legal assistance to 
question the validity of statutes under the Constitution . . . .”86 
Justice Kennedy has championed students’ free-speech rights. In Morse v. 
Frederick, the Supreme Court indicated that rational review applies to student 
speech made in the context of the non-public forum of a “school-sanctioned and 
school-supervised” event.87 The Court held that the school had a legitimate 
interest in regulating speech that could rationally be viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.88 Justices Kennedy and Alito concurred, and their votes were critical to 
 
79. See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92–95 (1985) 
(discussing eighteenth century liberalism and the freedom of speech in terms of “freedom of conscience,” which 
was used to support “personal liberty” and “intellectual progress,” as well as the “political function” of freedom 
of speech to expose the “mischief” of politicians). 
80.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167 (2013); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall 
Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on Speech, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693 (2012). 
81. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
82. Id. at 822–28 (alteration in original). 
83.  Id. at 828–37. For four Justices in dissent, Justice Souter said that there was no viewpoint 
discrimination because the university had simply denied funding for the subject matter of religious speech. Id. at 
863–64 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
84. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
85. Id. at 535. 
86.  Id. at 540–49. For four Justices in dissent, Justice Scalia viewed the government’s action as 
involving government spending of its own funds, not regulating other person’s speech, and thus subject only to 
minimum rationality review. Id. at 549–52 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
87. 551 U.S. 393, 393, 408–10 (2007). 
88. Id. 
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make up the majority.89 Their concurring opinion indicated that the more rigorous 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District test would apply 
to student-generated speech that was not connected to the school curriculum, 
even if the speech conflicted with the “educational mission” of the school.90 
In some cases, where the Court had concluded that the regulation was 
content-neutral, Justice Kennedy disagreed and concluded the regulation was in 
fact content-based. For example, in Hill v. Colorado, while the Court found that 
an injunction that affected abortion protesters was content neutral, Justice 
Kennedy recommended that the Court should break through the form of a speech 
regulation to the reality—that only one side of the abortion debate was being 
regulated.91 
C. Criminal Procedure Doctrine 
In cases involving criminal procedure, Justice Kennedy has been sensitive to 
the needs of police enforcement92 and to traditional constitutional doctrine 
regarding criminal procedural practice.93 In contrast, he has joined liberals in 
moderate civil-libertarian positions in death-penalty cases. For example, in Atkins 
v. Virginia, a 6–3 Court, including Justice Kennedy, discussed evolving societal 
practice to hold unconstitutional the death penalty for mentally retarded 
criminals.94 A similar pattern of voting occurred in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons, 
where the Court ruled that executing persons under eighteen was cruel and 
unusual punishment.95 Roper overruled the decision in Stanford v Kentucky, 
which permitted the execution of persons under eighteen in some 
circumstances.96 Even before Stanford, the Court had ruled in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma that it was unconstitutional for persons under sixteen to be executed.97 
 
89. Id. at 422–25 (Kennedy & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
90. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969)) (noting that 
under Tinker the school must show a concern with “substantial disruption” of the school environment, which 
reflects the intermediate review requirement of a substantial government interest to regulate, not a mere rational 
review approach). 
91. 530 U.S. 703 (2000); id. at 768–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 741–42 (Scalia, J., 
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today continues and expands its assault upon their individual 
right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”). 
92. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (holding a strip search 
constitutional of individual arrested on outstanding bench warrant after traffic stop). 
93. See Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 211 
(2013). 
94. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
95. 543 U.S. 551, 560–78 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–78, overruling Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. It should be noted that Justice 
Kennedy joined the majority in Stanford, id. at 364, but shifted his vote in Roper, perhaps based on the fact that 
fewer states authorized the death penalty for minors by 2005 than in 1989. 
97. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
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In Kennedy v. Louisiana, a 5–4 Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars 
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not 
cause, and was not intended to cause, the victim’s death.98 Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned that the “cruel 
and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment requires that 
punishment for crime be proportional to the offense, determined in terms of 
evolving societal standards rather than by standards prevailing when the 
Amendment was adopted.99 Those standards are determined by national 
consensus (considering the history of the Amendment, judicial precedents, 
legislative enactments, and state practice), and by the Court’s own independent 
judgment.100 Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas.101 
In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered the constitutionality of life 
imprisonment without parole for juveniles.102 Justice Kennedy had observed in 
Roper v. Simmons that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the 
worst offenders” because of: “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility”; “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and the “personality 
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”103 These observations support 
the notion that life imprisonment without parole is not an appropriate punishment 
for juvenile offenders, particularly for non-homicide offenses. In Graham v. 
Florida, following a Roper-like analysis, Justice Kennedy joined with Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor to hold unconstitutional life 
imprisonment without parole for juveniles for non-homicide offenses.104 
 
98. 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008). 
99. Id. at 434–38. 
100. Id. at 418–26. 
101.  Id. at 447 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Following the 
decision, it emerged that under the Military Code of Justice the death penalty is authorized for rape of a child 
when done by military personnel. This additional example of a government entity having a provision, not used 
in recent history, made no real difference in terms of the case outcome. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 1–3 
(2008) (petition for rehearing denied). Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was driven by an evolving consensus 
regarding standards of decency, and not the erroneous conclusion that no federal law imposes the death penalty 
for rape. 
102. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
103. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
104.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–30. Chief Justice Roberts agreed that a life sentence without parole for 
the armed burglary in this case was unconstitutional, but was unwilling to adopt the majority’s absolute rule 
applicable to any non-homicide offense. Id. at 2039–40 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). In dissent, 
focused on text and specific historical intent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, noted that 
“the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this sentencing practice, and . . . it would 
not have offended the standards that prevailed at the founding.” Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and 
Alito, J., as to Parts I and III). On these death-penalty cases generally, see Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of 
Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 229 (2013). 
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D. Structural Issues 
Two kinds of structural issues exist regarding the federal government. First, 
there are separation of powers issues regarding federal legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers. Second, there are federalism issues regarding the power of the 
federal government vis-à-vis the power of the States. 
1. Separation of Powers 
The most significant separation of powers cases for Justice Kennedy have 
involved the “war on terrorism.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case involving a United 
States citizen enemy combatant, a plurality of Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, concluded that “although 
Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances 
alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an 
enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis 
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”105 Reflecting a moderate civil-
libertarian position, the plurality noted: 
Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of 
warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and 
most politically accountable for making them. The Government also 
argues . . . that . . . military officers who are engaged in the serious work 
of waging battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by 
litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations 
would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result 
in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. To the 
extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened procedures, they 
are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.106 
Adopting a more conservative position, Justice Thomas agreed with the 
plurality in Hamdi that Congress had authorized military detention, but granted 
the President greater power to engage in unilateral action.107 Four Justices 
 
105. 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., 
plurality). 
106. Id. at 531–32 (citations omitted). 
107.  Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s 
war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision. . . . Arguably, Congress could 
provide for additional procedural protections, but until it does, we have no right to insist upon them.”). 
Following the Hamdi case, the government chose to release Mr. Hamdi, rather than prosecute him. His release 
was based on an agreement that he would give up his United States citizenship, relocate in another country, 
Saudi Arabia, and consent not to travel to an extensive list of countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, or 
Syria, where he could be presumably be recruited for terrorist activity. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi 
Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02. 
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dissented.108 Justice Scalia read the Suspension Clause, Article I, Section nine, 
Clause three, to give the Congress no independent power to authorize military 
detentions of United States citizens absent suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus, a position Justice Stevens joined.109 Adopting a less extreme position, 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg required a clear statement from Congress to 
authorize such detentions, which they said did not exist.110 
The issue of what rights non-United States citizens held at Guantanamo Bay 
should have in their trials was the focus of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.111 In Hamdan, 
the Court decided that no congressional act had expressly authorized the initial 
set of procedures adopted by the Bush Administration to try detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.112 Absent such congressional authorization, the procedures 
violated existing statutory and treaty requirements: the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.113 As Justice Kennedy 
pointed out in his concurrence, the UCMJ and Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions require that military commissions be “regularly constituted.”114 Such 
commissions are not established, he said, unless the government is prepared to 
explain why practical reasons require any differences between their structure and 
procedures and those used by courts-martial.115 The Court held that Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions applied because it regulates any “conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties.”116 The Court concluded that because acts by terrorists are not acts 
between “nations,” they are conflicts “not of an international character” as that 
phrase is used in the Geneva Conventions.117 
 A conservative dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and 
joined in part by Justice Alito, would have granted greater deference to the 
president.118 In part of his dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply, in part because the Court should defer to the 
president’s judgment that because the war on terrorism was “international in 
scope” it was a conflict “of an international character” for purposes of the 
 
108. Id. at 539 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment). 
111.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
112. Id. at 567. 
113. Id. at 565–67, 590–95, 628–32. 
114. Id. at 629, 632 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115. Id. at 636–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., as to Parts I & II, concurring 
in part). 
116. Id. at 637. 
117.  Id. at 629–32. 
118. Id. at 629. 
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Geneva Conventions.119 In a separate dissent, Justice Alito noted that even if 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied, it imposes only three requirements: 
“Sentences may be imposed only by (1) a ‘court,’ (2) that is ‘regularly 
constituted,’ and (3) that affords ‘all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples.’”120 The commissions created by the 
president met this standard, concluded Justice Alito, and there is no basis for the 
Court to strike down the commissions because their rules can be changed from 
time to time by the Secretary of Defense or that evidence may be admitted which 
has probative value to a reasonable person.121 
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, which set out procedures to govern trial of 
unlawful enemy combatants.122 The Act defined enemy combatants broadly as 
any foreign national individual that the president, or presidential designate, to 
have “purposefully and materially” supported anti-United States hostilities and is 
not part of a country’s regular armed forces.123 The ad hoc nature of the existing 
process before this statute was passed had naturally caused due process 
problems.124 In the Act, Congress expanded the evidence that could be used at 
trial from traditional UCMJ procedures—both hearsay evidence and evidence 
from coerced confessions (although not from torture), as long as the evidence 
meets a generic test of “probative value to a reasonable person.”125 The Act 
provided, however, for a ban on any habeas corpus petition filed by a non-United 
States citizen detainee, instead opting for a more limited review.126 In 
Boumediene v. Bush, a 5–4 Court, held that aliens designated as enemy 
combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional right of 
habeas corpus, and the procedures in the Military Commissions Act were an 
inadequate substitute.127 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that 
the procedures in the Military Commissions Act were inadequate because the 
 
119. Id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and by Alito, J., except for Parts I, II.C.1, and 
III.B.2, dissenting). 
120. Id. at 726 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., as to Parts I, II, & III, dissenting). 
121. Id. at 726–30. 
122. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. II 2006) (amended 2008). 
123. Id. 
124. See Haley A. Andrews, How Far Is Too Far?: The Supreme Court’s Response to the Executive 
Attempt to Improvise Constitutional Procedures During the War on Terror, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 123 (2005); 
Christopher C. Burris, Time for Congressional Action: The Necessity of Delineating the Jurisdictional 
Responsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts-Martial, and Military Commission to Try Violations of the 
Laws of War, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait, Rasul v. Bush: Unanswered Questions, 
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1129 (2005). 
125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. II 2006) (amended 2008). 
126. Id.; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2739. 
127. 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
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detainee is not allowed to present exculpatory evidence after the proceedings 
concluded, as would be needed for a Court of Appeals to make findings of fact.128 
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito, criticized Justice Kennedy’s opinion for not being sufficiently deferential 
to decisions by Congress and military authorities.129 Chief Justice Roberts said 
that the system created by Congress protects whatever rights the detainees may 
possess.130 As for use of later-discovered evidence, Chief Justice Roberts noted 
that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has the power to remand a 
case to the tribunal below to allow that body to consider such evidence.131 
Since Boumediene, a number of cases involving enemy combatants have 
been tried. In a number of these cases, courts have ordered detainees released due 
to a lack of evidence even under flexible evidentiary standards suggested in 
Hamdan and Boumediene.132 In other cases, courts have ordered individuals 
detained and held that the procedures adopted in the Military Commissions Act 
satisfy due process concerns, including a preponderance of the evidence standard 
to determine guilt; use of hearsay testimony, as long as it is “reliable”; and 
reasonable discovery procedures.133 
2. Federalism 
In 1976, a 5–4 Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery that the 
Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress, when exercising its Commerce Clause 
power, from directly displacing a state’s freedom to structure integral operations 
in areas of traditional governmental functions.134 Four liberal Justices dissented in 
National League.135 The critical fifth vote in National League belonged to Justice 
Blackmun.136 In National League, Justice Blackmun balanced the demands of 
federal versus state power, creating an area for state sovereignty, but noted that 
federal power should not be outlawed “in areas such as environmental protection, 
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility 
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.”137 
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, Justice Blackmun 
abandoned his National League balancing approach, a mere nine years after 
 
128. Id. at 787–92. 
129. Id. at 801, 821 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 822. 
131.  Id. at 801–03, 816–22 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
132. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
133. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
134. 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). 
135. Id. at 856, 867–68 (Brennan, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 880–81 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
137. Id. 
05_KELSO_VER_01_6-11-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 2:33 PM 
2013 / Jurisprudence on the First Amendment Religion Clauses 
122 
National League was decided.138 In Garcia, he joined the liberal dissenters in 
National League to overrule National League in favor of a strong, pro-federal 
power decision.139 Justice Blackmun said in his opinion for the Court that it was 
unworkable to seek limits on Congress’s power in terms of particular 
governmental functions, whether “traditional,” “integral,” “ordinary,” or 
“necessary.”140 Such distinctions merely invite judges to decide on what state 
policies they favor or dislike.141 Blackmun noted that any Tenth Amendment 
limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power are in the procedural safeguards 
inherent in the structure and political processes of the federal system, including 
the lobbying ability of groups like the National Governors’ Association, the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, or the 
Council of State Governments.142 
Despite conservative Justices typically having a strong states’ rights 
predisposition when deciding cases, during his tenure on the Court, Justice 
Kennedy has shown no willingness to reconsider this holding in Garcia. This is 
true despite four more conservative Justices on the Court today, no doubt willing 
to overrule Garcia, similar to the four conservative Justices in dissent in 
Garcia.143 
Despite Garcia’s Tenth Amendment doctrine, states’ rights have been 
indirectly enhanced after Garcia in two ways. First, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the 
Court held that Congress needs to make a clear statement in federal statutes for 
those statutes to apply to states also.144 The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
O’Connor, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Souter.145 Second, the moderate conservative Justices have carved out some 
meaning for the Tenth Amendment by banning federal commandeering of state 
legislative, executive, or administrative agencies. 
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor wrote for a 6–3 Court, 
including Justices Kennedy and Souter, that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”146 This doctrine is 
based upon the dual theory of sovereignty.147 Under that theory, as explained by 
Justice Kennedy in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the genius of our 
 
138. 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985) (Blackmun, J., for the Court) (Fair Labor Standards Act can be 
applied to city bus drivers). 
139. Id. at 529. 
140. Id. at 546–47. 
141. Id. at 547. 
142. Id. at 547–54. 
143.  Id. at 557–60 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting). 
144.  501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). 
145. Id. at 454. 
146. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (alteration in original). 
147. Id. at 155–59. 
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founding generation was to split sovereignty in the United States system into two 
parts: states and federal government.148 As Chief Justice Marshall had noted in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the founding generation established dual systems of 
government, each deriving its authority independently from the consent of the 
people.149 After all, the Constitution provides, in the first three words, “We, the 
People,” not “We, the States.”150 Further, the Constitution was ratified in special 
state conventions elected specially by the people for that purpose, not ratified by 
the existing state legislatures.151 Thus, in our system, there are two sovereign 
entities, the federal government and the states, linked by the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Section two. 
Under this dual theory of sovereignty, the federal government can regulate 
both individuals and states where constitutional power exists under the United 
States Constitution, and states can regulate individuals and the federal 
government under their own state constitutions and the United States 
Constitution consistent with doctrines of intergovernmental immunity.152 
However, the federal government cannot tell the states in any manner how they 
should regulate their own people because that would infringe on the states’ 
reserved sovereign power.153 
The 5–4 decision in Printz v. United States extended the theory of New York 
v. United States.154 There, the Court held that Congress could not require state 
officials to conduct a background check on persons who had applied to purchase 
a gun.155 Relying on the dual theory of sovereignty, history, and legislative and 
executive practice, the Court concluded that just as Congress could not 
commandeer the state legislature in New York, Congress cannot commandeer 
state executive or administrative officials.156 However, the Court suggested 
strongly in dicta in Printz, that Congress can commandeer state judges to enforce 
the United States Constitution.157 This is based on the view of the Framers and 
Ratifiers’ expectations that, given no federal court system under the Articles of 
Confederation and no requirement that Congress create lower federal courts, state 
 
148. 514 U.S. 779, 838–44 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
149. Id. at 839 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316 (1819)). 
150. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
151. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 846; see also U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., TEACHING WITH 
DOCUMENTS: THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, available at http://www.archives.gov/education/ 
lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
152. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1990). 
153. Id. 
154. 521 U.S. 898, 908–12 (1997). 
155. Id. at 935. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 905–07. 
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courts would be the primary initial enforcers of federal constitutional and 
statutory rights.158 
The Court has made it clear that the New York and Printz cases apply only 
where Congress attempts to “use” or “commandeer” state officials for federal 
purposes.159 These cases pose no Tenth Amendment limit on Congress’s power to 
regulate states or individuals directly.160 Thus, in Reno v. Condon, a federal act 
barring unconsented disclosure of drivers’ license information was applied to 
both the states and private persons.161 The Court stated that New York and Printz 
did not apply where the federal exercise of Commerce Clause power regulated 
state activities directly, rather than seeking to control or influence the manner in 
which the states regulated private parties.162 In Condon, because the federal 
statute regulated state workers at the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles and 
did not tell those workers how to regulate their own citizens, the federal act was 
constitutional.163 
III. KENNEDY AS A CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE 
In a few areas, Justice Kennedy has tended to join with the conservative 
Justices on the Court. The most prominent areas are: (1) state sovereign 
immunity cases, (2) the Bush v. Gore election case, (3) cases involving the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms, (4) campaign finance litigation, (5) the 
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), 
and (6) affirmative action cases. 
A. State Sovereign Immunity 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Court held 5–4 that Congress can 
create federal court actions against states for damages caused by acting under the 
Commerce Clause.164 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, said that Hans v. Louisiana 
declared otherwise.165 That case, Justice Scalia said, broadly held that despite the 
limited text of the Eleventh Amendment, federal jurisdiction over unconsenting 
states “was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial 
 
158.  Id. at 903–08. 
159. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150–51 (2000). 
160. Id. at 149 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)). 
161. Id. at 146. 
162. Id. at 149–51. 
163. Id. at 151. 
164.  491 U.S. 1, 13–23 (1989). 
165. Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (citing 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)). 
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power of the United States.”166 Justice Scalia observed that there was no need to 
state that conclusion in the Eleventh Amendment itself, since it was a 
background principle of wide acceptance.167 
The dissenters in Union Gas, joined by newly appointed Justice Thomas, 
voted to overrule Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.168 In 
Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens, dissenting, said the Eleventh Amendment 
applies only to suits premised on diversity jurisdiction.169 Justice Souter, 
dissenting, joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, also took issue with the holding 
in Hans “that a State could plead sovereign immunity against a noncitizen suing 
under federal-question jurisdiction, and for that reason a State must enjoy the 
same protection in a suit by one of its citizens.”170 Justice Souter explored 
historical materials to show that even those framers who expected common-law 
immunity to survive ratification were talking about diversity jurisdiction, not 
immunity of a state against the general federal-question jurisdiction of the 
national courts.171 Justice Souter concluded government action should not be 
trumped by judicially discoverable principles “untethered” to any written 
provision.172 
Despite the dissent’s analysis, a majority of the Court, including Justice 
Kennedy, have adhered to Seminole Tribe.173 Indeed, the Court extended 
Seminole Tribe through several cases, further limiting Congress’s power to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity by use of Congress’s Section five power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.174 The most important of these cases is City 
of Boerne v. Flores.175 In a 5–4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote that Section five 
authorized Congress only to remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions by 
states.176 Under Section five, Congress could not make a substantive change in the 
governing law.177 Justice Kennedy said that “[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.”178 Applying that test, Justice Kennedy examined the 
legislative record of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which purported to 
require strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis, of all state action that 
 
166.  Id. 
167. Id. at 31–32. 
168.  517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
169.  Id. at 76–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. at 102 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 100–85. 
172. Id. at 117. 
173. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
174. See, e.g., id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 518–20. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 520. 
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substantially burdens religious exercise.179 Justice Kennedy said the legislative 
record lacked examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed 
because of religious bigotry.180 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Act was 
“so out of proportion to . . . [any] remedial or preventive object that it . . . [was 
not] responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,” and was an 
attempt to make a substantive change in the law.181 
Applying the “congruence and proportionality test,” the Court has held 
subsequently that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was not 
“appropriate” legislation under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because there was no evidence of a sufficient pattern of state discrimination on 
the basis of age to which the statute would be a “congruent and proportionate” 
response.182 Thus, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in the case, because Congress has no power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity if the statute were viewed as only authorized under the Commerce 
Clause, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment.183 Similar results have been 
reached in other cases involving the power of Congress to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Congress’s Section five enforcement power, where the 
underlying regulatory legislation is based on the Commerce Clause power or 
other Article One authority.184 In each of these cases, Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, concluding that the legislation was “appropriate” 
under a proper definition of “appropriate” and not the majority’s heightened 
“congruence and proportionality” standard.185 
In two cases, Congress was able to establish that the remedial schemes were 
“congruent and proportional.”186 These cases dealt with the Family and Medical 
Leave Act’s provision for unpaid leave187 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
regulating access to state courthouses.188 In determining whether sufficient 
evidence exists to establish a pattern of state constitutional violations, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 
the Family and Medical Leave Act case, that where “the standard for 
 
179. Id. at 529, 532–36. 
180. Id. at 530–31. 
181. Id. at 529–36. 
182. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83, 86 (2000) (ADEA case). 
183.  Id. 
184. See generally Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding no civil 
action can arise against a state under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (Commerce Clause). 
185.  See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 386–89 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., 
dissenting). 
186. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003). 
187. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721. 
188. Lane, 541 U.S. at 509. 
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demonstrating the constitutionality of [government action] is more difficult to 
meet than our rational-basis test,” such as the intermediate scrutiny used to test 
cases of gender discrimination, it is “easier for Congress to show a pattern of 
state constitutional violations.”189 Even with regard to the mentally or physically 
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act, an area of rational basis 
scrutiny, the Court concluded in Tennessee v. Lane that there was sufficient 
evidence of state lack of compliance with the equal protection rights of disabled 
persons to equal access to state courthouses that the Americans with Disabilities 
Act was a “congruent and proportionate” response to state failures to build ramps 
to their numerous, but often old, county courthouses.190 In both of these cases, 
however, Justice Kennedy dissented and found no grounds to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity.191 In a recent case under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act’s self-care provision, Justice Kennedy again provided the critical fifth vote to 
find no grounds to abrogate state sovereign immunity.192 
B. Bush v. Gore 
The most noteworthy case involving equal protection issues and the right to 
vote during Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court is unquestionably Bush v. 
Gore.193 In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s recount decision in the 2000 Presidential election between 
Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore.194 One concern was the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision to recount only “undervotes”195 but not 
“overvotes.”196 A second concern was with the differing ways Florida counties 
chose to count the undervotes, some viewing an indentation as being sufficient to 
determine voter intent, while other counties required the card to be punched 
through.197 All of these issues were critical because under the original certified 
 
189. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736. 
190. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. 
191. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Lane, 541 U.S. at 
538 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia also dissented in Lane. Id. at 
554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
192. Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012). 
193. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
194. Id. at 100–03. 
195. “Undervotes” can occur if the machine does not register a vote, as would occur if the voter had 
punched the punch card but either did not pierce the card at all but only left an indentation, or punched the card 
but did not dislodge the chad. Id. at 129. 
196. Id. at 100. “Overvotes” can occur where the machine indicates more than one vote had been cast, as 
would occur for a voter marking a candidate’s name, but then also writing in that candidate’s name on the write-
in line. Id. at 107–08. 
197. Id. at 106–07. 
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result, Bush’s lead over Gore in Florida was just 537 votes, with Bush having 
received 2,912,790 votes and Gore 2,912,253.198  
Faced with these facts, seven Justices agreed that there were equal protection 
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.199 Five of these 
seven Justices concluded there was no way factually for a constitutionally 
adequate recount to be completed in time.200 In contrast, Justices Souter and 
Breyer concluded that the majority should not presume that a constitutionally 
adequate recount could not be completed in time.201 
It should be noted that the five Justices in the majority and the four Justices 
in dissent disagreed on whether the Court should have taken the case at all.202 The 
dissenting opinions suggested that the case was either a political question, or was 
not yet ripe for resolution.203 As Justice Souter noted in one dissent, 
If this Court had allowed the State to follow the course indicated by the 
opinions of its own Supreme Court, it is entirely possible that there 
would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review, and political 
tension could have worked itself out in the Congress following the 
procedure provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15.204 
Justice Breyer noted in another dissent, 
[T]he Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and 
responsibility to count electoral votes. . . . [T]here is no reason to believe 
that federal law either foresees or requires resolution of such a political 
issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to think that 
the Constitution’s Framers would have reached a different conclusion.205  
 
198.  On these issues, see generally Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyer’s Role in Selecting the President: A 
Complete History of the 2000 Election, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105 (2002). 
199. Bush,  531 U.S. at 111 (per curiam) (“Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional 
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.”); id. at 134 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J. in 
Part III, dissenting) (“I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the 
expressions of voters’ fundamental rights.”). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg decided that these problems were 
not serious enough to justify a finding of a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., 
joined by Stevens, J., in Part II, dissenting). 
200.  Id. at 110 (“[I]t is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the 
requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.”). 
201. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J. in Part III, dissenting) (“Unlike the majority, I see no 
warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply . . . before the date set for the meeting 
of electors, December 18.”). 
202. Id. at 129. 
203. Id. at 129; id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
204. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
205. Id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). 
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The majority per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did not directly address the 
issues of ripeness and political question.206 Justice Scalia did address, indirectly, 
the ripeness argument in his concurrence to the emergency stay order, which also 
served as a grant of a petition for certiorari in the case.207 He concluded that 
“irreparable harm” would result to “petitioner Bush, and to the country, by 
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election.”208 One 
can ask, however, whether it was ripe to conclude there would be a “cloud” on 
the “legitimacy” of the election if Congress were simply allowed to follow the 
constitutionally proscribed procedures for counting electoral votes without prior 
court intervention. In fact, based upon a later media-backed recount of the votes 
in Florida, it appears that Bush would have remained ahead even if the Florida 
recount had proceeded.209 At that point, Al Gore would have conceded the 
election, and there would have been no need for a Court decision. The five 
conservative Justices were uncertain that Bush would win the election, and may 
have wished to decide the case and ensure he did. 
Regarding the political question issue, it can be noted that there are judicially 
manageable standards under the Equal Protection Clause to govern resolution of 
this dispute and require uniformity in counting votes, using the Baker v. Carr 
factors to determine if an issue is a political question.210 In contrast, while the 
Court routinely resolves election disputes in the context of equal protection 
violations, the issue regarding electors is unique because the Constitution 
explicitly commits to Congress the responsibility of counting electoral votes211 
and commits to state legislatures exclusive power to create methods for selecting 
electors.212 Thus, under these provisions, there are “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitments” to “coordinate political departments,” and it could 
reasonably be regarded as a political question under Baker v. Carr.213 
Election challenges found little success in the wake of Bush v. Gore. Bush v. 
Gore was decided under rational basis review.214 Seven of the nine Justices held 
the recount authorized by the Florida Supreme Court unconstitutional under 
 
206. Id. 
207. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Emergency Stay Order) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
208. Id. 
209. See Rambo, supra note 198, at 325–26 n.1479. 
210. See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
212. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2;  see generally Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 
70, 76–78 (2000) (“[I]n such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct” means that this exclusive legislative 
power cannot be circumscribed by the Florida Constitution.); cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) 
(“[S]ole” power of Senate to try impeachments means Senate decisions regarding impeachment are political 
questions not subject to Court review.). 
213.  For discussion of both the ripeness and political question issues as applied to Bush v. Gore, see 
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001). 
214. 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000). 
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rational basis review, because it was so flawed in design215 that it was irrational in 
terms of an attempt to count votes equally.216 Most other election inequalities, 
however, such as optical scan machines in some counties of a state (more reliable 
but more costly),217 but punch cards in others (more prone to error but cheaper),218 
or differences in the amount of voting booths provided (so that in poor areas the 
lines typically are longer because not as many machines are provided), may be 
unfair, but are not likely to be viewed as irrational under a rational basis test. 
This is so particularly because considerations of administrative costs constitute a 
legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny to justify such 
disparities. For this reason, Bush v. Gore has not been viewed as very relevant in 
other election cases.219 Recent election cases have typically involved electronic 
voting equipment such as digital recording electronic devices (DREs).220 The 
main concern here is security of the machines from hackers and accurate 
electronic counting of the votes.221 
C. District of Columbia v. Heller 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held 5–4 that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, and that the 
District of Columbia’s prohibition on possessing usable handguns in the home 
violated that right.222 In Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Scalia acknowledged a 
principal purpose of the Second Amendment was to ensure that citizens had a 
right to own guns in order to participate in organized state militias, a purpose not 
relevant to participation in state militias today.223 However, while Justice Scalia 
noted that the Framers’ focus in the Second Amendment may have been the 
participation in militias, they also contemplated that individuals would use guns 
for self-protection.224 That right to own guns for self-protection still applied 
 
215. The design was flawed because of different ways to count punch-card ballots in different counties 
and only counting undervotes, not overvotes. Id. at 106. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
218. Id. 
219.  See generally Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting 
Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL. L. REV. 229 (2006). 
220. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711 (2005). 
221. Id. Given these problems, states are increasingly requiring a voter-verified paper trail for counties 
using DRE devices. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19250 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293B.084 (2005); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3506.18 (West 2005). 
222. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
223. Id. at 599. 
224. Id. at 595–600. 
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today.225 Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s opinion should not cast doubt on 
longstanding laws such as those prohibiting felons or the mentally ill from 
possessing firearms; forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings; or imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.226 Justice Scalia also noted that the right only 
extends to the “sorts of weapons” that were “in common use” at the time the 
Second Amendment was adopted.227 Thus, the right does not protect “dangerous 
and unusual weapons.”228 
Justice Stevens, dissenting with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, said 
that the text of the Second Amendment, the history of its adoption, and United 
States v. Miller, all indicate that the Amendment protects the right to keep and 
bear arms for military purposes, but does not limit the legislature’s power to 
regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of arms.229 The Court’s precedents, 
and the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment, 
support this view.230 Normally, Justice Kennedy would have relied on such 
sources and joined Justice Stevens’ opinion.231 In this case, however, Justice 
Kennedy joined the conservative Justices to uphold an individual’s right to own 
guns under the Second Amendment.232 
Heller will surely lead to legislative reexamination of gun-control laws and 
lawsuits challenging existing bans. The decision in District of Columbia v. Heller 
may have limited impact, however, except for rendering unconstitutional very 
intrusive regulations regarding owning handguns or rifles. Only a few cities have 
ordinances similar to the District of Columbia, and it is unclear how many those 
statutes are enforced in practice. Since Heller, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held in United States v. Fincher that machine guns and sawed-off 
shotguns were not covered by Heller because they are “dangerous and unusual 
weapons.”233 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nordyke v. King, held that a 
county ordinance barring guns on county property survived a Second 
 
225. See id. 
226. Id. at 626–28. 
227. Id. at 627. 
228. Id. 
229.  Id. at 636–40 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Reflecting a 
similar 5–4 split, the Court held in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), that the Second 
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3120 
(Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
230. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 637. “The text of the Amendment, its history, and our decision in 
United States v. Miller . . . provide a clear answer to that question.” Id. (citation omitted). 
231.  On Justice Kennedy’s approach to interpretation, see Gregory E. Maggs, Justice Kennedy’s Use of 
Sources of the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 77 (2013). 
232. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572 (stating that Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court). 
233. 538 F.3d 868, 886 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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Amendment challenge by gun show organizers seeking to set up a booth at local 
fairgrounds.234 
D. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b, prohibiting corporations from making 
independent expenditures that referred to a clearly identified candidate within 
thirty days of a primary election or within sixty days of a general election for 
public office.235 The Government advanced three interests which it said were 
compelling: distorting effects of large aggregations of wealth, an anti-corruption 
interest, and a shareholder protection interest.236 In his opinion for a 5–4 Court, 
Justice Kennedy rejected each one.237 He said that First Amendment protection 
does not depend on the speaker’s financial ability to engage in public 
discourse;238 independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption;239 and if the shareholder protection theory were 
adopted, it would give the Government power to restrict the political speech of 
media corporations and, furthermore, there is little evidence of abuse that cannot 
be protected by shareholders through the processes of corporation democracy.240 
Justice Kennedy stated the Court did not reach the question of whether the 
government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign corporations from 
influencing our nation’s political process.241 In striking down 2 U.S.C. § 441b, 
Justice Kennedy overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and part of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.242 The statute also included a 
disclaimer requirement243 indicating who is responsible for the content of any 
advertisement, and a disclosure requirement244 for any person spending more than 
 
234. 664 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In any event, the Ordinance does not prohibit gun shows, but 
merely declines to host them on government premises. The Proposed Second Amended Complaint, therefore, 
does not allege sufficient facts to state a Second Amendment claim capable of surviving a motion to dismiss.”). 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held, however, that bans on all firing ranges within Chicago likely 
violates the Second Amendment. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
235. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
236. Id. at 903. 
237. Id. at 904–08. 
238. Id. at 904. 
239. Id. at 908. 
240. Id. at 910. 
241.  Id. at 903–11. 
242.  Id. at 911–13 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and 
part of McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); see also United States v. Danielczyk, 791 F. 
Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a ban on direct corporate contributions to federal 
campaigns, imposed since 1907, under Citizens United). 
243. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006). 
244. Id. § 441f. 
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$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year.245 Justice 
Kennedy found no constitutional impediment to applying those requirements to a 
movie broadcast via video-on-demand, as there had been no showing that these 
requirements would chill speech or expression.246 
Justice Kennedy has consistently adopted the conservative free speech 
position in campaign finance cases. For example, in Davis v. Federal Election 
Commission, a 5–4 Court invalidated a “Millionaire’s Amendment” to campaign 
financing laws.247 The “Millionaire’s Amendment” allowed a candidate to receive 
treble the normal limit on individual contributions and unlimited party 
expenditures if the other candidate is regarded as self-financing because of 
spending more than $350,000 of personal funds.248 Since that provision was 
invalidated, so also were special disclosure requirements that were to be used in 
calculating self-financing expenditures.249 Justice Stevens, dissenting with 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, said the Amendment does not deprive the 
millionaire of any speech; it merely assisted the opponent of a self-financed 
candidate to make his voice heard.250 
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, a 5–4 
Court ruled unconstitutional a law allowing candidates for state office who 
accept public financing to receive roughly one dollar for every dollar spent by an 
opposing, privately financed candidate, once a set spending limit is reached.251 
The Court held that there was no compelling interest to equalize electoral 
funding.252 As in Davis, the four more liberal Justices dissented.253 
 
245. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914. 
246.  Id. at 913–14, 917. Justice Thomas joined all but the final part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, where 
the Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Id. at 916. Justice Thomas pointed to a number of 
examples wherein persons whose names and addresses were disclosed, as required by law, were subjected to 
attacks and were left subject to retaliation from elected officials. Id. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). He said that persons should have a right to anonymous speech. Id. Four other Justices 
dissented in the case. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). In his 
dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that there was plenty of evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
Congress’s concern to deal with corruption, distortion, and shareholder protection. Justice Stevens said the fact 
that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, and no thoughts or desires is a reminder that they 
themselves are not “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. Id. at 960–79. 
He concluded that the majority view is contrary to the long recognition by the people of the need to prevent 
corporations from undermining self-government. Id. at 948–60. These four Justices did agree with Justice 
Kennedy that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements were constitutional. Id. at 979. 
247. 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008). 
248. Id. at 729. 
249. Id. at 740–44. 
250. Id. at 749–57 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) 
251. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2812–13 (2011). 
252. Id. at 2828. 
253. Id. at 2829 (Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (compelling 
interest to counteract corruption of large campaign contributions). 
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Justice Kennedy joined the four conservative Justices in Federal Election 
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.254 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito acknowledged that McConnell upheld a ban on “express advocacy” by 
corporations within sixty days of a general election, or thirty days of a primary 
election, because there is a compelling interest in regulating “express advocacy” 
by corporations whose economic power could otherwise distort the election 
process.255 The Justices, however, held that McConnel did not control because the 
ads at issue in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. were more properly viewed as “issue 
ads” rather than “express advocacy” for a candidate.256 In adopting a test to 
distinguish “express advocacy” from “issue advocacy,” Chief Justice Roberts 
adopted a test by which most ads would be “issue ads,” since the “test affords 
protection unless an ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than 
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate” and any “tie is resolved in 
favor of protecting speech.”257 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas adhered to 
their view that McConnell was wrongly decided, and even “express advocacy” 
should be permitted by corporations throughout the election cycle.258 Given Chief 
Justice Roberts’ test, most ads will be viewed as “issue ads” anyway.259 
Continued skepticism toward campaign finance laws appears in lower federal 
court cases.260 
E.  Possible Future Cases 
1.  Healthcare 
Under current Commerce Clause doctrine, the power of Congress to pass the 
individual mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(Obamacare) should be clear. Under modern doctrine, two issues must be 
addressed: (1) does the regulation deal with commerce; and, if so, (2) does the 
 
254. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
255. Id. at 455–57. 
256. Id. at 456–57. 
257.  Id. at 474–82 & n.7 (Roberts, C.J., announcing judgment of the Court, joined by Alito, J., with 
respect to Parts III and IV). 
258. Id. at 483–84 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
259. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have upheld the regulations on the ground 
that the same compelling interest concerned with distortion of the election process by corporations with 
economic power applies to both “express advocacy” ads and most “issue ads.” Id. at 504–08 (Souter, J., joined 
by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
260. See Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(municipal cap on acceptance of contributions by any “person” that makes independent expenditures supporting 
or opposing a candidate unconstitutional); Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010) (voter-approved 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited political contributions from holders of no-bid contracts 
with state entities unconstitutional). 
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regulation deal with commerce among the states. Under United States v. Lopez, a 
5–4 decision by the conservative Justices, including Justice Kennedy, there are 
three ways to find such commerce among the states: (1) use of the channels of 
interstate commerce and protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
(Caminetti);261 (2) non-interstate activities if they threaten the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce (The Shreveport 
Rate Cases);262 or (3) commercial activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce (Wickard).263 
Certainly, the medical insurance industry market is a commercial market that 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce under Wickard. Even if one 
focuses solely on the individual mandate part of the Act, the cumulative 
economic effect resulting from a person choosing not to buy insurance is 
estimated at $1,000 a year.264 Additionally, even if the individual mandate is 
viewed as mandating commerce, not regulating existing commerce, Congress 
must have the ability to regulate both because, in the language of The Shreveport 
Rate Cases, where 
the government of the one [here, the interstate medical insurance market] 
involves control of the other [here, regulating persons currently 
uninsured], it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe 
the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the 
exercise of its constitutional authority, and the state, and not the Nation, 
would be supreme in the national field.265 
This has been true since Gibbons v. Ogden, where the Court held that to 
permit Congress to have national solutions to national problems, Congress can 
regulate whenever the commercial activity applies “to all the external concerns of 
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally.”266 
From the nation’s beginning, Congress has had the power to compel individuals 
to purchase things to advance important public policy purposes.267 For example, 
in the Second Militia Act of 1792, Congress required not only every able-bodied 
white male between the age of eighteen to forty-five to register for service in a 
 
261. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
262. Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 
(1914). 
263. 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121, (1942); Caminetti, 242 
U.S. 470; The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351–52). 
264.  See Official Transcript of Oral Argument, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida 9, 14 (Mar., 
27, 2012), available at www.supremecourt.gov (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
265. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351–52. 
266. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
267. See, e.g., Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, I Stat. 271 (1792). 
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State Militia, but also required each such individual to purchase a musket, 
ammunition, shoulder-carrying case, and other implements to outfit himself.268 
For these reasons, the real issue in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act should not be the power to regulate,269 but whether the individual mandate 
provision violates Due Process.270 While requiring every person to “buy and 
consume broccoli,” a concern of a district court in Florida,271 might violate due 
process, as not being rationally related to a legitimate government interest, 
requiring everyone to buy health insurance to avoid a problem of free-riders is 
rational.272 
Even conservative Justices have acknowledged these Commerce Clause 
principles in other recent cases. For example, in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich, a 6–3 
Court upheld application of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to 
intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes, which were 
allowed under provisions of California law.273 The majority opinion by Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned, as 
in Wickard v. Filburn, that Congress could find that failure to regulate this class 
of activity could result, in the aggregate, in a substantial effect on the broad 
market for illegal drugs that the CSA regulated.274 Congress acted rationally in 
determining that none of the characteristics making up the purported class of 
marijuana users compelled an exemption from CSA.275 Justice Scalia, concurring, 
said that in addition to a power to regulate activities having a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, Congress has power under The Shreveport Rate Cases to 
make its regulations of interstate commerce effective.276 Justice Scalia noted that 
even Lopez suggested that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local 
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of 
interstate commerce.”277 
 
268.  Id. 
269. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding the law is 
constitutional). 
270. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 
(N.D. Fla. 2011). 
271. See id. 
272. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011) (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress rationally found that the individual 
mandate would address the powerful economic problems associated with cost shifting from the uninsured to the 
insured and to health care providers . . . .”). 
273. 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005). 
274. Id. at 32–33. 
275. Id. at 14–33. 
276. Id. at 38. 
277. Id. at 33–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In Gonzales v. Raich, Justice O’Connor was 
joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id. at 42. Justice O’Connor concluded that 
“[t]he homegrown cultivation and personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes has no 
apparent commercial character.” Id. at 50. She noted that even Wickard did not specifically approve of federal 
control over small-scale, noncommercial wheat farming, since the federal law exempted the planting of less 
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Similarly, the Court adopted a broad approach to federal legislative power in 
United States v. Comstock.278 In Comstock, adopting a minimum rationality 
review approach, the Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which authorizes the 
Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal 
prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released, as long as the 
original confinement was within Congress’s power, either authorized by express 
constitutional text, such as for “counterfeiting” or “treason,” or a criminal law in 
furtherance of some other power, such as mail fraud statutes as related to the post 
office power.279 The Court also indicated that the same minimum rationality 
review governs the Commerce Clause issue of whether Congress could rationally 
think some activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.280 
Despite these decisions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Alito, indicated real concern at oral argument with whether the individual 
mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was 
constitutional.281 Justice Kennedy did acknowledge that he saw the connection 
between persons not buying insurance and that effect on other individuals,282 but, 
as it turned out, that was not enough for Justice Kennedy to vote to uphold the 
Act in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.283 
 
than six tons of wheat and, when the wheat was harvested, federal law exempted plantings of less than six acres. 
Id. at 50–51. Even if the activity was commercial in some sense, Justice O’Connor concluded, “There is simply 
no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to 
have a discernable [sic], let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit drug market–or otherwise to threaten 
the CSA regime.” Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., as to all but Part III, 
dissenting). 
278. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
279.  Id. at 1957–65. 
280.  Id. at 1956–57. Concurring in the judgment, Justices Kennedy and Alito indicated their belief that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis, and the Commerce Clause analysis, may well require more 
justification than a mere Equal Protection rational relationship test. Id. at 1966–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id. at 1968–69 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by 
Justice Scalia, was more forceful in rejecting the majority’s deferential Necessary and Proper Clause analysis. 
Id. at 1975–77 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., in all but Part III.A.1.b, dissenting). However, the five-Justice 
majority of Chief Justice Roberts and the four liberal instrumentalists, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor, adopted this view. 
281. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 264, at 4–14, passim. 
282. Id. at 104 (Kennedy, J., speaking) (“[T]he young person who is uninsured is uniquely proximately 
very close to affecting the rates of insurance and the cost of providing medical care in a way that is not true in 
other industries.”). 
283. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Following the initial drafting of this Article, 
the Supreme Court decided National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Id. In Sebelius, a five-
Justice majority voted to uphold the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id. at 2578. Four Justices would have upheld the mandate under the 
Commerce Clause, consistent with views expressed in this Article. Id. at 2609. In their view, the insurance 
mandate was a regulation of commerce, since at some point in their lives every individual will need health care, 
and thus individuals by being alive should be viewed as participating in the health care market. Id. (Ginsburg, 
J., joined by Sotomayor, J., and joined as to Parts I, II, III, and IV by Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, in a view shared 
by the other four Justices on the Court, including Justice Kennedy, concluded the mandate was not a 
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2. Affirmative Action 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, a 5–4 Court, per Justice O’Connor, concluded that 
the University of Michigan’s law school system of individualized consideration 
of applicants, taking race into account as a factor, satisfied strict scrutiny, 
consistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.284 On the other hand, with 
Justice O’Connor switching sides, a 5–4 Court in Gratz v. Bollinger held 
unconstitutional University of Michigan’s undergraduate system of giving the 
same extra points to every member of a minority group without regard to how 
much that individual had been the victim of prior discrimination.285 It was not the 
least burdensome effective alternative available to ensure the undergraduate 
program received the educational benefits flowing from a racially diverse student 
body.286 
With the replacement of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito in 2006, Justice 
Kennedy will likely become the critical swing vote on race-based affirmative 
action cases, including one the Court will hear this term.287 In his dissent in 
Grutter, Justice Kennedy indicated less willingness to defer to government 
decisions than Justice O’Connor, and a greater willingness to conclude that 
programs in practice are adopting more burdensome kinds of quota systems, 
rather than more permissible kinds of factor analyses.288 Justice Kennedy applied 
a similar hard look to the race-based affirmation action programs in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.289 While 
 
“regulation” of commerce, but rather “mandating” commerce, since it required individuals to purchase 
insurance. Id. at 2586–93. Since the text of the Commerce Clause only gives Congress the power “to Regulate 
Commerce,” these five Justices concluded that the mandate could not be authorized by the Commerce Clause. 
Id. (Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II, and III-C); id. at 2642–43 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
However, Chief Justice Roberts then adopted the judicial restraint maxim that when there are two possible 
interpretations, the court should interpret the statute in a way that is constitutional. Id. at 2592 (citing Parsons v. 
Bedford, 7 L. Ed. 732 (1830); Blodgett v. Holden, 274 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (concurring opinion)). Applying 
that maxim, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the mandate could be viewed as a tax on individuals who do 
not have health insurance, since “functionally” the provision operates as a tax, is collected by the Internal 
Revenue Service, and the amount of the payment varies depending on a person’s income, just like a tax. Id. at 
2593–96. Thus, the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s broad power to tax. Id. Thus, as with certain 
of Justice Kennedy’s more conservative positions in the Establishment Clause area which have not been 
adopted by a majority of the Court, see infra text accompanying notes 345–73, Justice Kennedy’s more 
conservative position was not adopted here, and thus did not become law. 
284. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–36 (2003). 
285. 539 U.S. 244, 270–76 (2003); id. at 276–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J., 
concurring only in Justice O’Connor’s opinion and in the judgment). 
286. Id. at 271–72. 
287. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
288. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
289. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (a case consolidating the appeals in Parents Involved in Comm. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) and McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 513 
(6th Cir. 2005)). 
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acknowledging that diversity in a student body is a compelling interest, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the affirmative action programs in these cases either did 
not clearly indicate whether they were using race: (1) as a factor, which would be 
permissible under Grutter v. Bollinger; (2) as an absolute point preference, quota, 
or set-aside, which would be impermissible under Gratz v. Bollinger; or (3) in a 
clearly impermissible manner, with a blunt “white/non-white” classification 
system.290 
The holding in Seattle School District No. 1 indicates the wisdom of moving 
to socio-economic affirmative action. Socio-economic affirmative action will be 
tested only by minimum rationality review, rather than the strict scrutiny given to 
race-based affirmative action. Even Chief Justice Roberts’ four-Justice plurality 
in Seattle School District No. 1 indicated a willingness to consider a broader 
concept of socio-economic diversity based upon “‘many possible bases for 
diversity admissions, [such as] admittees who have lived or traveled widely 
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and 
family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and 
have had successful careers in other fields.’”291 In a case this term involving use 
of race as a factor in the University of Texas undergraduate admissions process, 
Justice Kennedy may again apply a hard look and strike down the affirmative 
action program.292 
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY ON THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
A. Establishment Clause Analysis 
1. General Principles 
Under the Establishment Clause, four different tests have been used to find 
an “establishment of religion.” The four tests are: (1) the so-called Lemon Test, 
which asks whether the government action has a sole purpose to advance 
religion, or a principal or primary effect to advance religion, or creates an 
excessive entanglement between church and state;293 (2) whether an objective 
 
290. Id. at 783–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, did not specifically conclude, as did Justice Kennedy, 
that racial diversity in educational settings was a compelling interest. Id. at 725–32 (Roberts, C.J., joined by 
Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., as to Part III(B)); id. at 783–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). They avoided that issue by agreeing with Justice Kennedy that the programs here were not the least 
restrictive effective alternatives under strict scrutiny review. Id. at 732–36 (Roberts, C.J., opinion for the Court, 
joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.). 
291. Id. at 722 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338). 
292. See Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, rehearing en banc denied, 644 F.3d 301, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536. 
293. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
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observer would think the government action was an endorsement of religion;294 
(3) whether the government action is coercing or proselytizing religion;295 and (4) 
whether the government action is an unreasonable accommodation of religion 
given our Nation’s history and traditions.296 
The Lemon test is still supported by the liberal instrumentalist Justices, as the 
precedents decided under the Lemon test reflect the liberal policy of a strong 
separation of church and state.297 Justice O’Connor advocated replacing the 
Lemon test with an “endorsement” test, which Justice Souter was willing to 
follow.298 Justice Kennedy has focused more on the “coercion” or “proselytizing” 
of religion.299 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have 
wanted the analysis to focus on specific historical examples of accommodation 
between church and state, both at the time of ratification and examples of our 
nation’s history since that time.300 As conservative Justices, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito will likely take that approach. 
In 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court analyzed Establishment Clause 
doctrine in light of three concerns: (1) the law must have a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) the law’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the law must not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.301 The Lemon test, particularly as applied 
by liberal instrumentalist Justices, has been used to support sensitivity to 
religious diversity and the inclusion of all persons of different faiths or non-
believers as equal citizens in American society.302 More broadly, the Lemon test 
supports a pluralistic democracy by serving as 
a prophylactic measure that (1) protects religious liberty and autonomy, 
including the protection of taxpayers from being forced to support 
religious ideologies to which they are opposed; (2) stands for equal 
citizenship without regard to religion, . . . ; (3) protects against the 
 
294. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 598–600 
(1989). 
295. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–94 (1992). 
296. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683–88 (2005). 
297. See infra text accompanying notes 301–20. 
298. See infra text accompanying notes 340–43. 
299. See infra text accompanying notes 327–39. 
300. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would prefer . . . [doctrine] that is 
in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices, and that can be consistently applied–the central relevant 
feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God 
through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten 
Commandments.”). 
301. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
302. See generally Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. 
REV. 1 (2004). “[There is a] trend within a particular strand of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence that has become increasingly concerned with the religious minority’s sense of inclusion in a given 
religious message.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
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destabilizing influence of having the polity divided along religious lines; 
(4) promotes political community; (5) safeguards the autonomy of the 
state to protect the public interest; (6) shelters churches from the 
corrupting influences of the state; and (7) promotes religion in the private 
sphere.303 
As the Court has applied the Lemon test, it has come under attack as not 
reflecting, in practice, principled or predictable doctrine. For example, when 
considering the issue of legislative “purpose,” the Court concluded in Engel v. 
Vitale that beginning each public school day with a prayer had no secular 
purpose.304 The Court noted, “It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that 
each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of 
writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to 
the people themselves and to those the people choose to look for religious 
guidance.”305 Similarly, in Stone v. Graham, the Court held that a statute 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the walls of every public-
school classroom had only a religious purpose.306 At issue in Edwards v. 
Aguillard was the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Creationism Act forbidding the 
teaching of the theory of evolution in public elementary and secondary schools 
unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of the theory of “creation 
science.”307 The Court found the Act unconstitutional despite Louisiana’s 
argument they were merely supporting a diversity of viewpoints because “the 
primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious 
doctrine.”308 
On the other hand, the Court held in McGowan v. Maryland that a state law 
requiring businesses to be closed on Sunday, while having “strongly religious 
origin[s]” and thus accommodating religion, was nonetheless permissible 
because it had a secular purpose of providing “a uniform day of rest for all 
citizens.”309 In Gillette v. United States, the Court held that creating an exception 
to draft laws for conscientious objectors did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because the law was supported by the secular, pragmatic consideration of the 
difficulty of converting “a sincere conscientious objector into an effective 
fighting man.”310 In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia, the Court permitted a university to impose on students a fee to support a 
 
303. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 37 
(2004). 
304. 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). 
305. Id.  
306. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
307. 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987). 
308. Id. 
309. 366 U.S. 420, 433, 445 (1961). 
310. 401 U.S. 437, 452–53 (1971). 
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diversity of viewpoints, including religious viewpoints, because excluding 
religious viewpoints would be “hostile” to religion and would deny individuals 
free-speech rights.311 In addition, in a number of cases involving the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Court has held that states must accommodate the beliefs of 
religious citizens by exempting them from generally applicable regulations and 
that is not an unconstitutional legislative purpose.312 In some cases, public schools 
used the concern of a possible violation of the Establishment Clause as a 
justification for refusing to allow groups with a religious perspective to use 
school facilities.313 However, since Justice Kennedy has joined the Court, that 
justification has not been successfully invoked, because the Court has concluded 
that denial of equal access to school facilities violated the free-speech rights of 
such groups.314 
There are inconsistencies throughout the Court’s decisions regarding the 
second “principal or primary effect” prong of Lemon. For example, the Court has 
found a primary effect to advance religion in providing funds to repair “physical 
facilities” at a private religious school,315 but only an incidental effect where 
funds were provided to build “secular buildings” on a religious campus.316 
Additionally, the Court found a primary effect to advance religion by providing 
loans of “instructional equipment and materials” to private schools,317 but only an 
 
311.  515 U.S. 819, 842–46 (1995). 
312. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716–20 (1981) (stating 
unemployment compensation benefits cannot be denied to claimant, who terminated his job because his 
religious beliefs forbade participation in production of armaments); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–19 
(1972) (finding it is unconstitutional to apply Wisconsin’s compulsory education law to Amish parents who 
amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth 
grade would gravely endanger the free exercise of their religious belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–
09 (1963) (holding it unconstitutional to apply eligibility provisions of unemployment compensation statute to 
deny benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist, who had refused employment based on her religious beliefs). 
313. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203 (1963). 
314.  For example, in 1993, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 
384, 392–97 (1993), the Court held that a school district violated the First Amendment freedom of speech when 
it excluded a bible club from presenting films in a public forum opened by the school. Id. The school had denied 
access because the films’ discussion of family values was from a religious perspective. Id. For the Court, Justice 
White wrote that allowing use of school facilities for bible study would not have been an establishment under 
the three-part Lemon test or constitute government endorsement of religion. Id. Justice Kennedy, concurred in 
the judgment, but indicated his disapproval of the endorsement test. Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). Consistent with Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held in Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), that a public school violated the free speech rights of a religious club that 
was excluded from meeting after hours on school premises. Id. Justice Thomas said that if a public agency has 
opened a limited public forum, as was done here, its power to restrict speech is limited in two ways: it may not 
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and its restriction must be reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum. Id. at 106–20. The exclusion here, as in Lamb’s Chapel, constituted viewpoint 
discrimination. Id.  
315. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774–80 (1977). 
316. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678–89 (1971). 
317.  Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248–51 (1977). 
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incidental effect to provide “secular textbooks” to students.318 The Court also 
found a primary effect to advance religion to provide tuition grants to parents of 
children attending private schools,319 but only an incidental effect where tax 
benefits for textbooks, tuition, and transportation were granted to parents for 
children in public or private schools, despite the fact that parents of children in 
private schools would get most of the benefit, since private tuition is the main 
part of the expense, and ninety-six percent of children attending private schools 
attended religious schools.320 
Regarding the third “excessive entanglement” prong of Lemon, an attempt to 
police the risk that religious messages will be conveyed in a school program 
funded by public funds has constituted excessive entanglement of religion.321 At 
the same time, no excessive entanglement existed in annual state grants to private 
colleges, including religiously affiliated institutions, although four Justices 
dissenting would have found excessive entanglement from dependency on grant 
money.322 Recordkeeping and disclosure requirements associated with routine 
collection of sales taxes on sales of religious materials was held to create no 
excessive entanglement,323 while recordkeeping and disclosure requirements on 
charities soliciting funds in a city, where disclosure included names, salaries, and 
criminal histories of solicitors, and reports of funds collected, was held to 
constitute excessive entanglement when applied to religious organizations.324 
2. Coercion or Proselytizing in the School Context 
In 1980, before Justice Kennedy joined the Supreme Court, the Court held in 
Stone v. Graham that the display of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the 
walls of public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause as its sole purpose 
was to advance religion.325 The decision in Stone was per curiam and summarily 
reached without full briefing and argument. 326 
 
318. Bd. of Educators of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240–48 (1968). 
319. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780–83. 
320. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–403 (1983). 
321. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000). 
322.  Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404–14 (1985) (finding entanglement); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. 
Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 761–67 (1976) (finding no entanglement); id. at 770–73 (Brennan, J., joined by 
Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 773–75 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding 
entanglement). 
323. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808. 
324. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392–97 (1990) (finding no 
entanglement); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1534–42 (11th 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807 (1994) (finding entanglement). 
325. 449 U.S. 39, 41, 43 (1980). 
326. Id. at 40–43. Four Justices dissented in the case. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun 
indicated they would grant certiorari and give the case plenary consideration. Id. at 43 (Burger, C.J., joined by 
Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also dissented from the summary reversal, indicating his view that, so 
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Once Justice Kennedy joined the Court in 1992, his vote controlled in Lee v. 
Weisman.327 In Weisman, the 5–4 Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that a public 
school could not offer an invocation or benediction in a graduation exercise 
because this exerted a subtle coercive pressure on students to participate in, or 
appear to participate in, a religious exercise, given the fact that presence at 
graduation is, in a practical sense, obligatory.328 Justice Kennedy explained that a 
“state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk the freedom of belief and conscience 
which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.”329 
Reflecting a pragmatic approach, Justice Kennedy indicated that literal legal 
coercion was not required if in-fact coercive pressure existed.330 
For Justice Kennedy, the case was distinguishable from Marsh v. Chambers, 
which upheld prayers at legislative sessions, because any influence is much less 
in that setting.331 In legislative sessions, any benediction is directed to individuals 
as part of discharging their public jobs.332 Those individuals already have well-
formed views.333 The benedictions were not part of a state-sponsored educational 
program, as in Weisman, with the state coercing or proselytizing on behalf of 
religion.334 This focus on “coercion” as the touchstone of Establishment Clause 
analysis is consistent with an emphasis on legislative and executive practice, 
which, during the first 150 years of the Nation’s history, was predominantly 
concerned with: “(1) institutional mingling between government and religion, (2) 
direct governmental support for a particular religion, (3) special privileges for a 
particular religion, or (4) coercion of religious belief, including the punishing of 
non-adherents.”335 
An indication of how close the issue of “coercion” is in Weisman is the fact 
that, according to Justice Blackmun’s private court papers (made public in 2004), 
Justice Kennedy initially voted in the case to uphold the graduation benediction 
as not being coercive.336 Justice Kennedy was assigned to write that opinion for 
 
far as appears, the lower courts applied correct constitutional criteria. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice 
Rehnquist filed a dissent, stating that the statute did have a secular purpose of acknowledging the role the Ten 
Commandments has played in the social, cultural, and historical development of our Nation. Id. at 44–46 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
327.  505 U.S. 577, 590–99 (1992). 
328. Id. at 586–99. 
329.  Id. at 592. 
330. Id. 
331. 463 U.S. 783, 792–95 (1983). 
332. Id. at 783. 
333. Id. at 821. 
334. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
335. Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 399, 400 (2002); see also generally id. at 400–09; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins of the Religion 
Clauses of the Constitution: Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939–
41 (1986). 
336. Charles Lane, Blackmun’s Papers Shine Spotlight on Control of High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
2004, at A01. 
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the conservative position, but in drafting the opinion he changed his mind, 
eventually viewing the benediction as creating too much subtle coercive 
pressure.337 Justice Kennedy thus switched his vote and wrote the opinion for 
himself and the other more liberal Justices on the Court.338 Perhaps this partly 
explains Justice Scalia’s bitter dissent, and his focus on why, in his view, there 
was no unconstitutional coercion present in Weisman.339 
While Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote in Weisman, and thus his 
adoption of the “coercion” test was determinative in that case, given the change 
in Court membership since 1992, a five-Justice majority (Justices Stevens, 
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) analyzed Establishment Clause cases 
from 1994–2005 from the more vigorous requirement of “neutrality,” which 
prohibits government “endorsement” of religion.340 For example, in 2000, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a student prayer delivered before a 
football game.341 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held 
6–3 that school involvement in the process of selecting the student speaker 
invited and encouraged religious messages.342 Reflecting the endorsement theory, 
the Court opinion noted, “Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, 
the message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably 
perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of 
approval.”343 The Court also noted that the prayer was “coercive” under Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Lee v. Weisman.344 
3. Coercion or Proselytizing in Non-School Cases 
In cases not involving children in school, Justice Kennedy has been less 
willing to find coercion, and has often voted differently than results under the 
endorsement approach. For example, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, a county displayed a crèche in the 
county courthouse and a city displayed a menorah in front of the City-County 
 
337. Id. 
338.  See, e.g., id. 
339. 505 U.S. at 636–44 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
340. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 314–15. 
343. Id. at 308. 
344. Id. at 312. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with Justices Scalia and Thomas, said the majority 
opinion “bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.” Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia 
& Thomas, JJ., dissenting). The Court should not declare the policy invalid on its face because it has plausible 
secular purposes—to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship, and thereby also to promote student 
safety. Id. at 320. The dissent noted that “‘[i]t has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges 
to statutes . . . to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional’” 
behavior. Id. at 319 n.1 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988)) (alterations in original). 
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Building.345 The crèche had a banner that proclaimed, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo,” 
and there were no figures of Santa Clause or other decorations.346 The menorah 
was placed next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign titled “Salute to 
Liberty.”347 Beneath this title, the sign stated: “During this holiday season, the 
city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the 
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.”348 Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, would have held that both displays 
violated the Establishment Clause.349 Justice Brennan stated, “I continue to 
believe that the display of an object that ‘retains a specifically Christian [or 
other] religious meaning,’ is incompatible with the separation of church and state 
demanded by our Constitution.”350 
In contrast, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor drew distinctions between the 
crèche display and the menorah/Christmas tree/sign (MCS) display.351 Both 
viewed the crèche display as having the impermissible effect of endorsing 
religion,352 while both viewed the MCS display as not constituting government 
endorsement.353 Justice Blackmun explained his conclusion that the two displays 
were different by noting that 
the combination of the tree and the menorah communicates, not a 
simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but 
instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an 
acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative 
tradition. . . . The sign states that during the holiday season the city 
salutes liberty.354 
Justice O’Connor explained her conclusion that the two displays were different 
by noting that the crèche display conveys a message to non-adherents of 
Christianity that they are “not full members of the political community,” and a 
corresponding message to Christians that they are “favored members of the 
political community.”355 However, the MCS display sent a message of pluralism 
 
345. 492 U.S. 573, 579–82 (1989). 
346. Id. at 580–81. 
347. Id. at 581–82. 
348. Id. at 582. 
349. Id. at 649–50 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
350.  Id. at 637 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
351. Id. at 581–85. 
352.  Id. at 598–602 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
353. Id. 
354.  Id. at 616–21 (this part of Justice Blackmun’s opinion was joined by no other Justice on the Court). 
355. Id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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and freedom to choose one’s own beliefs, and not a message of endorsement of 
Judaism or of religion in general.356 
Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, 
said that both displays were constitutional.357 Reflecting his coercion approach to 
the Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy noted that in his view, only two 
limiting principles should exist on accommodating religion: (1) the “government 
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise,”358 
and (2) “it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give 
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”359 Justice Kennedy also stated that 
to find unconstitutional advancement of religion here reflects “an unjustified 
hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our 
precedents.”360 
In 2005, in McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky, a five-Justice majority of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer held that posting a version of the Ten Commandments in a 
courthouse was unconstitutional.361 Justice Souter’s majority opinion struck down 
the display based on the first prong of Lemon, that its “primary purpose” was to 
advance religion.362 Justice O’Connor, concurring, noted that the “primary 
purpose” behind the county’s display was relevant because, under her 
endorsement test, it conveyed “an unmistakable message of endorsement to the 
reasonable observer.”363 Indeed, consistent with this view, in 1987 Justice 
O’Connor had joined with Justice Powell, concurring in Edwards v. Aguillard, 
noting that to violate the Establishment Clause the “religious purpose must 
predominate.”364 
In Part I of his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Thomas, would have upheld the display of the Ten Commandments based 
 
356.  Id. at 625–27, 632–37. 
357. Id. at 576 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
358. Id. at 659. 
359. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)) (alteration in original). 
360. Id. at 655 (citations omitted). 
361. 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005). 
362.  Id. at 861–65; see also ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(finding a judge’s display of a framed poster in his courtroom of the Ten Commandments, which he created 
himself on his computer, unconstitutional, despite being displayed across from a similarly styled framed poster 
of the Bill of Rights). 
363. Id. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690). 
364. 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring). In American Civil 
Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County, Kentucky, 607 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010), the preliminary 
injunction against the display of the Ten Commandments which the Supreme Court affirmed in McCreary 
County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), was made permanent. 
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on a “customs and traditions” approach.365 In Part II of his dissent, which was 
also joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for (1) 
shifting the focus in Lemon from “actual” government purposes to how 
government purposes would be “perceived” by an objective observer under an 
“endorsement” inquiry; and (2) modifying Lemon to hold that “primary” or 
“predominate” religious purposes, rather than “sole” religious purposes, can 
violate the first prong of the Lemon test.366 In Part III of his dissent, Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, concluded that, even under the Lemon test, the 
display was motivated not by a religious purpose, but by a non-coercive secular 
acknowledgment of the role the Ten Commandments have played in our Nation’s 
moral and legal history.367 
On the same day McCreary was decided, Justice Breyer voted in Van Orden 
v. Perry with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, 
to uphold a plaque of the Ten Commandments that was included among sixteen 
other plaques on grounds in front of the Texas Capitol building.368 In this case, 
Justice Breyer concluded: 
In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments 
can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral 
message (about proper standards of social conduct). And in certain 
contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a historical message 
(about a historic relation between those standards and the law) . . . . The 
circumstances surrounding the display’s placement on the capitol 
grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the 
latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to predominate. And 
the monument’s 40-year history on the Texas state grounds indicates that 
has been its effect.369 
The other eight Justices on the Court decided McCreary and Van Orden the 
same way.370 Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg concluded that 
this plaque in Van Orden also constituted an endorsement of religion.371 Chief 
 
365. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 885–94 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., and 
joined in Parts II and III by Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
366. Id. at 900–03. 
367.  Id. at 903–12. 
368. 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
369. Id. at 701. 
370. Id. at 677–79. 
371.  Id. at 738–39 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“[A] pedestrian happening 
upon the monument at issue here needs no training in religious doctrine to realize that the statement of the 
Commandments, quoting God himself, proclaims that the will of the divine being is the source of obligation to 
obey the rules, including the facially secular ones.”). Responding to an argument that the sixteen other plaques 
reduced the religious message conveyed by the plaque, Justice Souter responded, 
But 17 monuments with no common appearance, history, or esthetic role scattered over 22 acres is 
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas found no coercion 
or proselytizing in placing the plaque, and said that the plaque was consistent 
with the Nation’s history and traditions.372 For them, whatever “may be the fate of 
the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we 
think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has 
erected on its Capitol grounds.”373 
Cases involving the Ten Commandments continue to be litigated. Following 
Van Orden, the Eighth Circuit held en banc in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. 
City of Plattsmouth that a granite monument in a city park displaying the Ten 
Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause.374 A dissenting opinion 
noted that, unlike the display in Van Orden, the monument’s message here stood 
alone with nothing to suggest a broader historical or secular context.375 The 
dissent also noted that 
the oft noted image of Moses holding two tablets, depicted on the frieze 
in the Supreme Court’s courtroom, appears in the company of seventeen 
other lawgivers, both religious and secular. Similarly, the depiction of 
Moses and the Ten Commandments on the Court’s east pediment also 
finds him in the company of renowned secular figures.376 
On the other hand, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that placing a Ten Commandments 
monument on a county courthouse lawn was an impermissible endorsement of 
religion, particularly given statements by commissioners underscoring the 
religious significance of the message.377 The county was also ordered to pay, over 
ten years, $199,000 in attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.378 
 
not [one display] . . . . One monument expresses admiration for pioneer women. One pays respect to 
the fighters of World War II. And one quotes the God of Abraham whose command is the sanction 
for moral law. . . . In like circumstances, we rejected an argument similar to the State’s, noting in 
County of Allegheny that “[t]he presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere in the 
. . . [c]ourthouse . . . fail to negate the [crèche’s] endorsement effect . . . . [T]he crèche . . . was its 
own display distinct from any other decorations . . . in the building.” 
 Id. at 742–43 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 598–99 (1989)) 
(alterations in original). Justice O’Connor also dissented in Van Orden. 545 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
372. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677–78. 
373. Id. at 688 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., plurality opinion). 
374. 419 F.3d 772, 774–77 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc opinion) (citations omitted). 
375. Id. at 778–81 (Bye, J., joined by M.S. Arnold, J., dissenting). 
376.  Id. at 780 (Bye, J., joined by M.S. Arnold, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
377. 568 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010). 
378. CNN Wire Staff, Oklahoma County Must Pay Up in Ten Commandments Case, CNN (July 28, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-28/us/oklahoma.ten.commandments_1_aclu-granite-monument-court 
house-lawn?_s=PM:US (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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In 1934, in Salazar v. Buono, private citizens had placed a Latin cross on a 
rock outcropping in a remote section of the Mojave Desert, owned by the federal 
government, in order to honor American soldiers who died in World War I.379 In 
2004, the federal government passed a statute to transfer the cross and the land 
on which it stands to a private party, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in order to 
avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.380 In Buono, a 5–4 Court remanded 
the case to the district court to determine whether a “reasonable observer” would 
view the transfer as the endorsement of religion.381 Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion strongly indicated the transfer should be viewed as constitutional.382 He 
noted, “Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It 
evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of 
Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the 
fallen are forgotten.”383 
The accommodation permitted in Buono, of course, has its limits. For 
example, in American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a sequence of crosses erected on Utah highways to 
memorialize fallen Utah Highway Patrol state troopers violated the 
Establishment Clause, as they would convey to a reasonable observer the 
message that the state prefers, or otherwise endorses, a certain religion.384 
4. Support for Religious Expression or Aid in Schools 
For Justice Kennedy, other aspects of government support for private 
religious schools do not pose the same kind of problem of proselytizing or 
coercion as prayer, or benedictions at graduation, or posting of the Ten 
Commandments in the school context. Even under the endorsement test, such 
support is more likely to be held constitutional, although on narrower grounds. 
For example, in 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the Court overruled early cases 
decided under the Lemon test which had limited the kind and amount of 
government aid to private religious schools.385 In a case involving Title I funds, 
used to provide remedial education, guidance, and job counseling to eligible 
students, Justice O’Connor rejected the argument that Title I provides aid to 
religion by creating incentives for persons to attend parochial schools.386 She 
stated that no such incentive exists where the aid is allocated on the basis of 
 
379. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1807 (2010). 
380. Id. at 1829. 
381. Id. at 1821. 
382. Id. at 1820. 
383. Id. 
384. 616 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2010). 
385.  521 U.S. 203, 208–18, 235–36 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. 
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
386. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223–31. 
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neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and where the aid 
is made available to religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory 
basis.387 
The weakening of the Lemon test in the school aid context continued in 2000 
in Mitchell v. Helms.388 In a plurality opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, upheld a federal program 
funding state agencies that loaned educational materials and equipment to public 
and private schools, with the enrollment of each participating school determining 
the amount of aid.389 Justice Thomas noted that in Agostini, the Court had 
modified the Lemon test for the purpose of evaluating aid to schools by stating 
that entanglement is not a separate inquiry, but only one criterion for deciding if 
there is a primary effect of advancing religion, and by revising criteria for 
determining the principal or primary effect of a statute.390 After Agostini, Justice 
Thomas said three primary criteria are used to evaluate whether government aid 
has the effect of impermissibly advancing religion: does the aid “result in 
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or 
create an excessive entanglement.”391 Justice Thomas also noted that government 
neutrality, rather than indoctrination, is virtually assured if an aid program 
literally, or figuratively, passes through the hands of numerous private citizens 
who can direct the aid elsewhere by choosing a school for their children.392 In 
such a case, the private citizen is making the choice, not the government.393 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment, but 
said the plurality was relying too heavily on formal neutrality and the plurality’s 
discussion of direct versus indirect aid and of diversion was flawed.394 For Justice 
O’Connor, the three Agostini criteria are “factors” to be weighed against an 
overall decision of whether a reasonable observer would conclude that the 
government’s action constituted an “endorsement” of religion.395 From that 
perspective, as Justice O’Connor noted: 
[A] government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the 
number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the 
government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, 
 
387.  Id. at 228–32. Four more liberal Justices dissented in Agostini. Id. at 241–47 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., and which Breyer, J., joined in part, dissenting). 
388. 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., 
plurality opinion). 
389. Id. at 801–02, 836. 
390. Id. at 808–09. 
391. Id. at 808 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234). 
392. Id. at 816. 
393. Id. at 809–14, 820–25. 
394. Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
395. Id. at 843–44. 
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decide to use the aid at the same religious schools. In the former 
example, if the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in its 
students, it is reasonable to say that the government has communicated a 
message of endorsement. . . . In contrast, when government aid supports 
a school’s religious mission only because of independent decisions made 
by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, “[n]o 
reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts . . . an inference that 
the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.”396 
The more accommodating approach toward school aid issues adopted in 
Mitchell continued in 2002 in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.397 Zelman involved a 
pilot program adopted by the state of Ohio in 1996 to provide educational 
choices to families with children who reside in a “covered district,” defined to 
apply only to Cleveland.398 Under the program, the state provided tuition aid of up 
to $2,250 per year to parents who chose to send their child to a school other than 
a Cleveland public school.399 Any private school, whether religious or 
nonreligious, could participate in the program and accept program students so 
long as the school was located within the boundaries of a covered district and met 
statewide educational standards.400 Participating private schools had to agree not 
to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to 
“advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.”401 Any public school 
located in a school district adjacent to the covered district could also participate 
in the program.402 Adjacent public schools were eligible to receive the same 
 
396. Id. at 842–43 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), (citing Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (discussing “endorsement”). Justice Souter, 
dissenting with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, agreed with Justice O’Connor that the Agostini criteria are 
factors to be weighed in an overall balance concerning the principal or primary effect of any aid program. Id. at 
868, 889–99 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). In engaging in this factor analysis, 
Justice Souter noted that the Court’s precedents under Lemon has considered “whether the government is acting 
neutrally in distributing its money, and about the form of the aid itself, its path from government to religious 
institution, its divertibility to religious nurture, its potential for reducing traditional expenditures of religious 
institutions, and its relative importance to the recipient, among other things.” Id. at 868–69. In addition, 
reflecting concerns with entanglement between church and state, Justice Souter noted that the Court’s 
precedents had expressed concern with whether state aid would “violate a taxpayer’s liberty of conscience, 
threaten to corrupt religion, [or] generate disputes over aid.” Id. at 901. In this case, Justice Souter said, the 
plurality was rejecting the fundamental principle that had emerged from applying these factors in earlier cases 
of no taxpayer funded aid to a school’s religious mission. Id. at 912. Here there was aid to the schools 
themselves which could be used, and was being used, to advance the religious inculcative functions of the 
recipient religious schools. Id. at 868–69, 885, 901, 908–13. 
397. 536 U.S. 639, 643–48 (2002). 
398. Id. at 643–44. 
399. Id. at 645. 
400. Id. at 647. 
401. Id. at 645 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6)). 
402. Id. 
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$2,250 tuition grant for each program student accepted, in addition to the full 
amount of per-pupil state funding attributable to each additional student, 
although none of the public schools chose to participate in the program.403 
Given these details, the governmental aid program was neutral on its face 
with respect to religion, providing voucher assistance for educational expenses to 
a broad class of citizens, who made independent judgments whether to use the 
voucher to fund educational expenses at religious or secular private schools.404 
For the Mitchell majority, including Justice Kennedy, this made the program 
clearly constitutional.405 Justice Thomas also noted in a separate concurrence that 
the main beneficiaries of this program would be low-income minorities living in 
Cleveland who wished for educational alternatives to the Cleveland public 
schools, which were “[b]esieged by escalating financial problems and declining 
academic achievement.”406 
Concurring as the critical fifth vote, Justice O’Connor emphasized the 
limited nature of the program: it did not provide “substantial” aid to the religious 
schools; the nonpublic schools, both religious and secular, had to accept students 
without regard to “race, religion, or ethnic background”; and the parents had a 
range of non-religious private schools from which to choose.407 Thus, the program 
could not be viewed by a reasonable observer as government endorsement of 
religion.408 Lower court opinions after Zelman have followed this approach.409 
 
403. Id. at 643–48. 
404. Id. at 662–63. 
405. Id. at 652–54. 
406. Id. at 676–77 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
407. Id. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
408. Id. at 668–76. In his dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted 
that under this voucher program up to $2,250 in tuition vouchers could be used by parents sending their children 
to religious schools. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). He noted, 
The money will thus pay for eligible students’ instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion 
as well, in schools that can fairly be characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to 
imbue teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension. Public tax money will pay at a systemic 
level for teaching the covenant with Israel and Mosaic law in Jewish schools, the primacy of the 
Apostle Peter and the Papacy in Catholic schools, the truth of reformed Christianity in Protestant 
schools, and the revelation to the Prophet in Muslim schools, to speak only of major religious 
groupings in the Republic. 
Id. Under the instrumentalist-era precedents of Allen, Tilton, and Nyquist, among others, this aid to religious 
schools, not limited to secular materials, secular instruction, or secular construction, would have been held to 
violate the Establishment Clause, as Justice Souter noted. Id. at 686–93. 
409. See Am. Jewish Congress v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 354–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(stating federally chartered corporation’s AmeriCorps Education Awards Program, a nationwide community 
service program which allowed participants to be placed as teachers in both secular and religious schools, did 
not violate Establishment Clause, even though some participating individuals at religious schools elected to 
teach religion in addition to secular subjects; participants were chosen without regard to religion, participants’ 
choice to teach religion in addition to secular subjects did not have imprimatur of government endorsement, and 
participants who chose to teach in religious schools did so only as a result of their own private choice). 
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Regarding religious influences in the public schools, it is relatively 
uncontroversial that public schools can teach about religion and religious 
influences on society and historical events.410 Indeed, in 1963 in School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court acknowledged that reading passages 
from religious works, such as the Bible, the Torah, or the Koran, was permissible 
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, as they are 
worthy of study for their literary and historic qualities.411 For Justice O’Connor, 
as well as Justice Kennedy, these cases do not raise difficult issues. As she stated, 
concurring in Elk Grove School District v. Newdow, “It is unsurprising that a 
Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious freedom should 
find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths.”412 
Note, for example, the following state mottoes: Arizona (“God Enriches”); 
Colorado (“Nothing without the Deity”); Connecticut (“He Who Is Transplanted 
Still Sustains”); Florida (“In God We Trust”); Ohio (“With God All Things Are 
Possible”); and South Dakota (“Under God the People Rule”).413 Arizona, 
Colorado, and Florida have placed their mottoes on their state seals, and the 
mottoes of Connecticut and South Dakota appear on the flags of those states as 
well.414 Georgia’s newly redesigned flag includes the motto, “In God We 
Trust.”415 Many of our patriotic songs contain overt or implicit references to the 
divine, among them: “America” (“Protect us by thy might, great God our 
 
410.  See generally Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329 
(2002). 
411. 374 U.S. 203, 223–27 (1963). 
412. 542 U.S. 1, 35–36 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
413. Arizona State Motto, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Arizona/motto_ 
arizona.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Colorado State Motto, STATE 
SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Colorado/state_motto.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review); Connecticut State Motto, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbols 
usa.org/Connecticut/mottoConnecticut.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); 
Florida Symbols—Emblems—Icons, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Florida/State-
Symbols-Florida.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Ohio State Motto, 
STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Ohio/Ohio-state-motto.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); South Dakota Symbols—Emblems—Icons, STATE SYMBOLS USA, 
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/South_Dakota/StateSymbolsSDakota.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
414. Arizona State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Arizona/seal.html (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Colorado State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA, 
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Colorado/seal_colorado.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); Floria State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Florida/ 
seal_florida.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Connecticut State Flag, 
STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Connecticut/flag_CT.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); South Dakota State Flag, STATE SYMBOLS USA, 
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/South_Dakota/state_FLAG.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
415. Georgia State Flag, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Georgia/Flag_ 
Georgia.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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King”);416 “America the Beautiful” (“God shed his grace on thee”);417 and “God 
bless America.”418 
Concerning the phrase “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, 
[c]ertain ceremonial references to God and religion in our Nation are the 
inevitable consequence of the religious history that gave birth to our 
founding principles of liberty. It would be ironic indeed if this Court 
were to wield our constitutional commitment to religious freedom so as 
to sever our ties to the traditions developed to honor it.419 
Consistent with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Elk Grove School District 
v. Newdow, in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, the Ninth Circuit 
held that voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because the addition of the phrase “Under God” in 1954 
advanced the secular purposes of (1) underscoring the political philosophy of the 
Founding Fathers that God granted certain inalienable rights to the people which 
the government cannot take away, and (2) adding a note of importance to the 
Pledge as a matter of ceremonial deism.420 This decision departed from the Ninth 
Circuit’s earlier ruling in Newdow v. United States Congress.421 
It is also reasonably well-established that public schools can teach and 
perform sacred choral music as an integral part of a complete and historically 
accurate music education, to broaden the students’ understanding of musical 
culture and to increase awareness of diversity.422 Such use is permissible as long 
as the sacred choral music does not predominate the music selection to create a 
“principal or primary effect” to advance religion under Lemon; lead an objective 
observer to conclude the school is endorsing religion under the endorsement test; 
or involve proselytizing or coercing students to participate in a religious, rather 
than musical, event, under the coercion test. 423 
 
416. Rev. Samuel F. Smith, America (My Country, ‘Tis of Thee), SCOUTSONGS http://www.scoutsongs 
.com/lyrics/america.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
417. Katharine Lee Bates & Samuel Ward, America the Beautiful, SCOUTSONGS, http://www.scoutsongs 
.com/lyrics/americathebeautiful.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
418. Irving Berlin, God Bless America, SCOUTSONGS, http://www.scoutsongs.com/lyrics/godbless 
america.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
419.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44–45 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
420. Newdown v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). 
421.  328 F.3d 466, 481–82 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
violates the Establishment Clause), vacated on standing grounds sub. nom., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
422. See generally Richard Collin Mangrum, Shall We Sing? Shall We Sing Religious Music in Public 
Schools?, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (2005); Faith D. Kasparian, Note, The Constitutionality of Teaching and 
Performing Sacred Choral Music in Public Schools, 46 DUKE L.J. 1111 (1997). 
423.  Mangrum, supra note 422; Kasparian, supra note 422. 
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Although schools may include sacred choral music as part of an overall 
music curriculum, a school is not required to do so. Thus, in Stratechuk v. Board 
of Education, the Third Circuit held that a school district’s policy to bar 
performance of religious holiday music at seasonal shows, while allowing it to be 
taught in class, had a legitimate secular purpose of avoiding potential 
Establishment Clause problems.424 This is particularly true when a school has a 
history of parental complaints about which religious holiday music had been 
included in the past.425 
B. Free Exercise Clause Analysis 
The main issue of contention under the Free Exercise Clause concerns what 
standard of review the Court should use. An important change in the level of 
protection given to the free exercise of religion occurred in 1963.426 Writing for 
the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan said that strict scrutiny should 
apply when a law imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.427 
A state had refused unemployment compensation to appellant, a member of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, on the ground that she had failed to accept 
available suitable work when offered because she refused to work on Saturday, 
the Sabbath day of her faith.428 Justice Brennan said that the effect of the law was 
to pressure the appellant to forgo the practice of her religion.429 This was 
compounded by the religious discrimination in the scheme, for even in times of 
emergency no employee could be required to work on Sunday if he or she had 
conscientious objections to such work.430 Where a substantial burden was 
imposed, no showing of a mere rational relationship to some colorable state 
interest would suffice; the state had to show a paramount interest.431 The state did 
not show any interest in Sherbert beyond the possibility of fraudulent claims by 
persons claiming religious objections to Saturday work.432 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan distinguished the 1961 case of 
Braunfeld v. Brown, where the Court had refused to require an exception to a 
Sunday closing law for a Jewish merchant, who would have to close on both 
Saturday and Sunday.433 Justice Brennan distinguished Braunfeld because in that 
 
424. 587 F.3d 597, 604–10 (3d Cir. 2009). 
425. See id. at 603. 
426. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
427. Id. at 403–06. 
428.  Id. at 399–402. 
429. Id. at 404. 
430. Id. at 406. 
431. Id. at 403. 
432.  Id. at 402–09. 
433. 366 U.S. 599, 607–10 (1961). 
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case, there was a strong state interest in one uniform day of rest for all workers.434 
Justice Brennan added that the Court was not fostering an “establishment” when 
ordering compensation to be paid, because extending unemployment benefits to 
Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshipers reflects government neutrality 
and does not interrelate religions with secular institutions.435 No other person’s 
religious liberties are abridged,436 nor did appellant’s religious convictions make 
her a nonproductive member of society.437 The Court reached a similar conclusion 
in 1981 in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, holding that the state could not deny a claimant who terminated his job 
because his religious beliefs forbade participation in production of armaments.438 
The Court also applied a strict scrutiny approach for a burden on religious 
beliefs in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder.439 In Yoder, the Court held that it would 
violate the free exercise rights of Amish parents to require their children to attend 
public high school.440 For the Court, Chief Justice Burger said that the state did 
not have an interest of sufficient magnitude to overbalance the Amish claims to 
free exercise of religion, considering testimony that compulsory formal education 
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger, if not destroy, the free exercise of 
Amish religious beliefs.441 There was also evidence that additional years of 
formal high school for Amish children would do little to serve the state’s 
interests in education, especially since most Amish children plan to live in Amish 
society and, with respect to those who might leave, there is nothing to suggest 
that Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would 
fail to find ready markets in today’s society.442 
Despite application of strict scrutiny, courts uphold a number of cases of 
government actions burdening religious beliefs as satisfying a compelling 
government interest, the least restrictive alternative analysis. For example, in 
United States v. Lee, the Court held that Congress could require all employers, 
including Amish employers, to pay social security taxes, even if such payments 
 
434.  374 U.S. at 403–04. 
435. Id. at 409. 
436. Id. 
437. Id. at 409–10. Justice Stewart, concurring in Sherbert v. Verner, said that Braunfeld was wrongly 
decided and should be overruled. Id. at 417–18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). Justice Harlan, dissenting 
with Justice White, pointed out that the state law did not provide unemployment compensation for persons who 
are unavailable for work for personal reasons of any kind. Id. at 422–23 (Harlan, J., joined by White, J., 
dissenting). Reflecting a Holmesian deference-to-government approach, Justice Harlan said the Court should 
not require the state to carve out an exception from that principle for those unavailable because of religious 
convictions. Id. Such compulsion is particularly inappropriate in light of the indirect, remote, and insubstantial 
effect of the state’s decision on the exercise of appellant’s religion. See id. 
438. 450 U.S. 707, 713–20 (1981). 
439.  406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
440. Id. at 219. 
441. Id. at 221. 
442. Id. at 209–19. 
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would violate the Amish’s religious beliefs.443 Congress had granted self-
employed Amish an exception from participation in the Social Security program, 
but the choice not to extend that exception to Amish employers was for Congress 
to make.444 Similarly, the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, upheld other 
aspects of economic regulations against free exercise challenges, such as 
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act requirements on minimum wages and 
record keeping requirements to religious organizations conducting “ordinary 
commercial activities,” or application of other aspects of the tax code.445 
The Court also noted that a strict scrutiny standard was inappropriate if the 
challenge was to how the government was conducting its own affairs, rather than 
regulating the affairs of private citizens. For example, in Bowen v. Roy, the 
challenger complained that the federal government’s requirement that his 
daughter have a Social Security number in order for him to collect AFDC welfare 
benefits violated his religious belief that assigning her a number would tend to 
“rob the spirit” of his daughter.446 The Court responded, “Absent proof of an 
intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion in 
general, the Government meets is burden when it demonstrates that a challenged 
requirement for government benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a 
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.”447 Similarly, the 
Court held in Goldman v. Weinberger that the United States military could apply 
its uniform dress regulations to deny an Orthodox Jewish service member the 
right to wear a yarmulke while on duty.448 In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, the Court applied the doctrine of Bowen v. Roy to conclude, 
under a rational basis approach, that the government could permit the harvesting 
of timber and construction of a road on federal government land, despite 
objections from three Native American tribes that such activities interfered with a 
portion of that land they traditionally used for religious purposes.449 
In 1990, however, a majority of the Supreme Court in Employment Division 
v. Smith changed the Free Exercise doctrine.450 In Smith, persons were dismissed 
from their jobs because of their religious use of peyote, illegal under state law, 
 
443. 455 U.S. 252, 256–61 (1982). 
444. Id. at 261. 
445. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392–97 (1990); Tony & 
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (addressing the FLSA in the context of 
minimum wage case); Lull v. Comm’r of IRS, 602 F.2d 1166, 1172 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 
(1980); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 587–89 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970) 
(applying the FLSA in the context of taxation cases). 
446.  476 U.S. 693, 696–701 (1986). 
447.  Id. at 707–08. 
448. 475 U.S. 503, 505–10 (1986). 
449. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,  485 U.S. 439, 441–42, 447–51 (1988). 
450. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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and the resulting denial of unemployment compensation.451 Justice Scalia, joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, White, and Kennedy, wrote that 
the use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise cases did not extend beyond: (1) 
unemployment compensation cases involving denial for refusing to work for 
religious reasons, such as working on one’s sabbath, as in Sherbert v. Verner, 
based on that precedent being “settled law”; (2) cases involving “hybrid” claims, 
that is, claims based on a conjunction of Free Exercise claims combined with 
other constitutional protections, such as Freedom of Speech, or, as in Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, the right of parents to direct the education of their children, where the 
related right would trigger strict scrutiny on its own; or (3) cases involving direct 
discrimination against religion.452 
An example of the third kind of case is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.453 In this case, the city adopted a special rule regarding the 
ritual slaughtering of animals, which was different and more burdensome than 
the rules regarding slaughtering of animals for secular food purposes.454 The 
Court thus applied a strict scrutiny approach and held the ordinance 
unconstitutional.455 
In the absence of these three circumstances, the Court held in Smith that 
where there is a general neutral regulation that has merely an incidental effect on 
the exercise of religion, the Court will not use a heightened level of review.456 To 
do so, said Justice Scalia, would be to allow a person, by virtue of his beliefs, to 
become a law unto himself.457 He said this would contradict constitutional 
traditions and common sense.458 Justice Scalia distinguished the use of strict 
scrutiny in cases of race discrimination or content regulation of speech, where the 
heightened level produced equality of treatment or an unrestricted flow of 
speech, with what would be produced here: a private right to ignore a generally 
applicable law that denies unemployment compensation when dismissal results 
 
451.  Id. at 874–78. For a good discussion of the background facts surrounding the Smith case, see 
GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001). 
452. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–85. 
453.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
454. Id. at 527–28. 
455. Id. at 530–47; see also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 
F.3d 359, 364–66 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding a police department’s decision to provide medical exemptions to its 
no-beard requirement, while refusing religious exemptions from same requirement, was subject to heightened 
scrutiny based on religious discrimination), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999). But see Valov v. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 178–83 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding a California statute requiring full-face 
photograph on driver’s licenses, with no exemption for persons whose religious beliefs bar such personal 
photographs, constitutional as a neutral law promoting expeditious identification of persons during traffic stops 
and at accident scenes, deterring identity theft, and preventing fraud, relying on Smith and Bowen v. Roy). 
456. 494 U.S. at 881. 
457. Id. at 877–78. 
458. Id. at 874–76. 
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from using an illegal drug.459 Subsequently, the state of Oregon created a 
religious exemption for peyote use, but that is a matter of legislative choice, not 
constitutional mandate.460 
Reacting to the Smith case, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).461 RFRA called for courts to use strict scrutiny 
whenever any government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, 
even if the burden results from a law of general applicability.462 In City of Boerne 
v. Flores, the Court declared RFRA invalid as applied to state laws.463 Congress 
sought to justify RFRA as an exercise of power under Section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.464 Justice Kennedy said that there must be congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or modified and the means 
adopted to that end.465 Here, the legislative record lacked examples of modern 
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.466 The 
RFRA, said Justice Kennedy, is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventing object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
prevent, unconstitutional behavior on the part of States.467 Justice O’Connor said 
that Smith was wrong and should be re-examined, as did Justices Breyer and 
Souter.468 
Congress did not surrender, but has only been able to change the law 
somewhat. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (RLUIPA), a strict scrutiny approach is statutorily applied to all laws 
regarding any land use regulation or prison regulation that imposes a substantial 
burden on religion if: (1) that burden affects, or removal of that burden would 
itself affect, interstate commerce; (2) the burden is imposed in a program or 
activity receiving federal financial aid; or (3) the burden is imposed in 
implementation of any regulation that permits individual assessments of the 
 
459.  Id. at 885–90. 
460.  Current Oregon law regarding peyote use appears at Oregon Revised Statutes section 475.840. 
Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment, and Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
dissenting, said the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious 
practices or beliefs, whether imposed directly through prohibitions or indirectly by the denial of a benefit. Id. at 
893–97, 905–07 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined in Parts I & II by Brennan, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ.). In either case, the government should have to satisfy a strict standard, as called for in Sherbert 
and Yoder. Id. (finding strict scrutiny met on these facts); id. at 907–16 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & 
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (finding statute unconstitutional under strict scrutiny). 
461. Pub. L. 103–141 (Nov. 16, 1993), codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006). 
462. Id. 
463. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
464. Id. at 529–36. 
465. Id. at 529–30. 
466. Id. at 533. 
467. Id. at 530–36. 
468. Id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., except as to the first paragraph of Part I, 
dissenting); id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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proposed property use.469 The validity of this legislation in the context of a prison 
regulation was upheld in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where the Court unanimously ruled 
that the statute was merely an attempt to respect the Free Exercise rights of 
prisoners and did not create an Establishment Clause problem as long as the 
statute did not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over the 
institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”470 
In Hankins v. Lyght, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the earlier-
passed RFRA on Commerce Clause grounds, as applied to federal rather than 
state laws.471 In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the 
Supreme Court similarly applied the RFRA’s compelling interest test to strike 
down the failure under the federal Controlled Substance Act to grant an 
exception for sacramental use of hallucinogenic tea.472 The decision was 
unanimous, with Justice Alito not participating in the consideration or decision of 
the case.473 Meanwhile, in cases not covered by RLUIPA or the RFRA, lower 
courts continue to apply Smith and its holding that the court should only apply a 
rational relation test even when a substantial burden has been imposed on the 
exercise of religious behavior.474 
One might wonder why religious conservatives undermined strict scrutiny 
Free Exercise Clause review in Smith. The key is found in a passage near the end 
of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith.475 There, he stated, 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process 
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a 
law unto itself . . . .476 
Thus, the presumption seems to be that religions more well-established in the 
United States in terms of overall numbers of adherents, like Protestant sects or 
Catholics, will be protected by the legislature as part of democratic sensitivity to 
the majority, while only religions of small groups would need Free Exercise 
Clause protection. Typically, it has been such minority religious groups—Amish, 
Seventh-Day Adventists, Native Americans, or Jews—that have triggered 
 
469.  Pub. L. 106–274 (Sept. 22, 2000), codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006). 
470. 544 U.S. 709, 719–26 (2005). 
471. 441 F.3d 96, 107–09 (2d Cir. 2006). 
472. 546 U.S. 418, 424–39 (2006). 
473. Id. at 439. 
474. See, e.g., Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding where prisoners did 
not raise RLUIPA, the court analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause a prison rule allowing only the chaplain to 
consume wine during Communion services under a rational basis standard of review). 
475. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
476. Id. 
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litigation.477 And, as a general matter, it is liberal Justices who are usually more 
sensitive to protecting minority rights, which occurs under the 1963–1990 
Sherbert v. Verner strict scrutiny approach.478 
That this doctrine can yield anomalous results is evidenced by the dispute 
this past year over the Obama Administration’s requirement that all employers, 
either themselves or through their health insurers, provide contraceptive coverage 
under their health care plans, even Catholic-affiliated institutions, like 
universities or hospitals, which have traditional religious objections to 
contraception.479 Under Sherbert, the Catholic Church could force the government 
to satisfy strict scrutiny to impose this obligation on them.480 Under the Smith 
doctrine, the Catholic Church does not appear to have any serious Free Exercise 
argument, although, consistent with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion 
in Hankins, noted above, they may have a statutory RFRA argument.481 
In addition to these protections, all Justices on the Supreme Court support a 
“ministerial” exception to laws applied to the internal operations of religious 
organizations. For example, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a ministerial 
exception in Hossana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.482 That case involved a teacher, formally 
commissioned as a minister in the religious order, who filed an Equal 
Employment Opportunity complaint.483 
This decision is consistent with lower federal courts handling of similar 
issues. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Tomic v. 
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, that the ministerial exception bars an ADEA lawsuit 
by a fifty-year-old church music director who was fired after a dispute with the 
bishop’s assistant over music to be played for Easter services.484 The church then 
hired a “much younger person” as a replacement.485 The court noted that, 
if the suit were permitted to go forward, the diocese would argue that he 
was dismissed for a religious reason—his opinion concerning the 
suitability of particular music for Easter services—and . . . Tomic would 
argue that the church’s criticism of his musical choices was a pretext for 
 
477. See supra text accompanying notes 446–62. 
478.  Id. 
479. See generally N.C. Aizenman, Peter Wallsten & Karen Tumulty, Obama Shifts on Birth Control, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2012, at A01. 
480. See supra text accompanying notes 427–37. 
481. See supra text accompanying notes 472–76. 
482.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
483. Id. at 699–701. 
484. 442 F.3d 1036, 1037–42 (7th Cir. 2006). 
485. Id. at 1037. 
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firing him, that the real reason was his age. . . . The court would be asked 
to resolve a theological dispute.486 
Similarly, in Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a teacher at a private Catholic school 
could not sue the school for retaliation for protected speech and sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when she 
was terminated after signing a pro-choice advertisement in a local newspaper.487 
The court held that her claims were not cognizable, since it would necessitate the 
court’s assessment of the relative severity of violations of church doctrine.488 The 
Court noted: 
Were we . . . to require Ursuline [Academy] to treat Jewish males or 
males who oppose the war in Iraq the same as a Catholic female who 
publicly advocates pro-choice positions, we would be meddling in 
matters related to a religious organization’s ability to define the 
parameters of what constitutes orthodoxy.489 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian 
Church that a Presbyterian minister could sue her former church under Title VII 
for sexual harassment and retaliation that occurred prior to her discharge that do 
not implicate the church’s protected employment decisions.490 In her complaint, 
she alleged that shortly after the Calvin Presbyterian Church hired her as the 
Associate Pastor, the Church’s Pastor engaged in sexually harassing and 
intimidating conduct toward her, creating a hostile work environment.491 The 
Court noted that as part of this lawsuit, the Church could: 
assert as an affirmative defense that they “exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct the harassment, and that [the plaintiff] failed to take 
advantage of these opportunities to avoid or limit harm.” . . . “Nothing in 
the character of this defense will require a jury to evaluate religious 
doctrine or the ‘reasonableness’ of . . . religious practices . . . .”492 
 
486. Id. at 1040. 
487. 450 F.3d 130, 138–42 (3d Cir. 2006). 
488. Id. at 142. 
489. Id. at 141. 
490.  375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005). 
491. Id. 
492.  Id. at 957 (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949–50 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
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The court noted that while the decision to terminate her ministry was clearly 
within the scope of the ministerial exception, she may “nonetheless hold the 
Church vicariously liable for the sexual harassment itself.”493 
A federal district court held in Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists that the “ministerial exception” did not apply to Title VII sex and 
pregnancy discrimination claims by a teacher who was terminated from a 
Seventh-Day Adventist school for being pregnant and unmarried, as her teaching 
duties were primarily secular.494 Her duties that were religious in nature were 
limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day and attending religious 
ceremonies with students only once per year.495 Churches have also been held 
liable in child sex abuse cases by church personnel, including priests or ministers, 
although it is a matter of debate whether various laws limiting damages against 
charitable institutions should be invoked to limit liability in such cases.496 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted in this Article, for most of his twenty-five years on the United 
States Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy has been predominantly known as a 
moderate civil libertarian. Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian approach 
can be seen most prominently in four different areas of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence: (1) due process and equal protection clause analysis, (2) First 
Amendment freedom of speech, (3) criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, 
and (4) structural issues of separation of powers and federalism. In certain cases, 
however, he has joined his more conservative judicial colleagues, and may join 
them in future cases. These areas include existing doctrine, such as cases 
involving (1) state sovereign immunity, (2) the Bush v. Gore election case, (3) 
cases involving the Second Amendment and right to bear arms, (4) campaign 
finance litigation, (5) the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), and (6) affirmative action cases. With respect 
to the religion clauses of the First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause—Justice Kennedy has likewise adopted more 
conservative judicial positions. 
It is possible that Justice Kennedy may lean more toward the conservative 
side in later high-profile cases. If so, his legacy on the Court may not be as a 
moderate civil libertarian, which is his legacy today, but reflect more the 
conservative strain in his jurisprudence. For those who have applauded Justice 
Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian decisions, that would be an unfortunate 
 
493.  Id. at 960. 
494. 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
495. Id. 
496. On this issue, see generally Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justices: 
Making Churches Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1201 (2003). 
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development. Further, since a moderate civil-libertarian approach reflects more 
aspects of a progressive agenda, and since over time, progressive ideology tends 
to prevail over conservative ideology because it represents the future, not the 
past, history would not likely view kindly any such shift toward a more 
conservative jurisprudential stance. 
 
